

LETTERS,

ON THE

Spirit of PATRIOTISM:

ON THE

Idea of a PATRIOT KING:

AND

On the STATE of PARTIES,

At the Accession of

KING GEORGE the First.

D U B L I N:

Printed for J. SMITH, at the *Philosophers Heads*
on the *Blind-Quay*, and G. FAULKNER in
Essex-street, Booksellers. MDCCXLIX.

LETTERS

ON THE

Spirit of Patriotism

ON THE



ON THE STATE OF PARTIES

At the Association of

KING GEORGE THE FIFTH

DUBLIN

Printed by J. Smith, at the Press, for the
on the 1st day of October, 1894.
J. Smith, Dublin.

Advertisement.

THE following papers were written several years ago, at the request, and for the sake of some particular friends, without any design of ever making them public. How they came to be made so at this time, it may be proper to give an account.—

The original draughts were entrusted to a man, on whom the author thought he might intirely depend, after he had exacted from him, and taken his promise, that they should never go into any hands, except those of five or six persons, who were then named to him. In this confidence the author rested securely for some years; and tho' he was not without suspicion, that they had been communicated to more persons than he intended they should be, yet he was kept, by repeated assurances, even from suspecting

that any copies had gone into hands unknown to him. But this man was no sooner dead, than he received information that an entire edition of 1500 copies of these papers had been printed; that this very man had corrected the press, and that he had left them in the hands of the printer, to be kept with great secrecy, till further order. The honest printer kept his word with him better than he kept his with his friend; so that the whole edition came at last into the hands of the author, except some few copies which this person had taken out of the heap, and carried away. These are, doubtless, the copies which have been handed about, not very privately, since his death. The rest were all destroyed in one common fire as soon as they were given up, except a copy or two, which have never been since out of the author's own hands. By these copies it appeared, that the man who had been guilty of this breach of trust, had taken upon him further to divide the subject, and to alter and to omit passages, according

according to the suggestions of his own fancy.

What aggravates this proceeding extremely is, that the author had told him on several occasions, among other reasons why he would not consent to the publication of these papers, that they had been writ in too much heat and hurry for the public eye, tho' they might be trusted to a few particular friends. He added, more than once, that some things required to be softened, others to be strengthened, and the whole most certainly to be corrected; even if they were to remain, as he then imagined they would, in the hands of a few friends only. This has been done since, that there might be one copy at least more conformable to the author's intentions than those which had gone abroad, or even than his original manuscripts.

There is scarce a man in the world more detached from it, at this hour, than the author of these papers, or more indifferent to the censure of most people in

it, having nothing to expect, nor any thing to fear from them. He might, therefore, in his way of life, and in his disposition of mind, either not have known that scraps and fragments of these papers had been employed to swell a monthly magazine, and that the same honourable employment of them was to be continued; or, knowing it, he might have despised and neglected it. But some of his friends thought that it was too much to suffer this breach of trust, and the licentious advantage taken of it, to make him appear the author of writings, which were become more properly the writings of others than his, considering how they had been garbled, and in what manner they were published. The editor therefore, who has in his hands the genuine copy which the author reserved to himself, after revising and correcting the originals, resolved to publish it; since it was become impossible to hinder such as were not genuine from being retailed monthly or weekly to the world. Neither the author nor he would give
 offence

offence wantonly to the living: but the author neither can, nor ought, on any account, to neglect what truth, honour, and the justice due to his own character require. Neither the author nor be affected to accuse ministers after their death, as the Egyptians formerly accused even their kings. There is the less reason to do so, since the former may be, and are accused, without scruple, tho' without success for the most part, during their lives. The anecdotes here related were true, and the reflections made upon them were just, many years ago. The former would not have been related, if he who related them had not known them to be true; nor the latter have been made, if he who made them had not thought them just: and if they were true and just then, they must be true and just now and always. The author therefore scorns to disown them: and the editor thinks that he has no excuse to make for publishing them.

LETTER I.

On the SPIRIT of PATRIOTISM.

My LORD,

1736.

YOU have engaged me on a subject which interrupts the series of those letters I was writing to you; but it is one, which, I confess, I have very much at heart. I shall therefore explain myself fully, nor blush to reason on principles that are out of fashion among men, who intend nothing by serving the public, but to feed their avarice, their vanity, and their luxury, without the sense of any duty they owe to God or man.

It seems to me, that in order to maintain the moral system of the world at a certain point, far below that of ideal perfection, (for we are made capable of con-

10 O N T H E S P I R I T

ceiving what we are incapable of attaining,) but however sufficient upon the whole to constitute a state easy and happy, or at the worst tolerable: I say, it seems to me, that the Author of nature has thought fit to mingle from time to time, among the societies of men, a few, and but a few of those, on whom he is graciously pleased to bestow a larger proportion of the ethereal spirit that is given in the ordinary course of his providence to the sons of men. These are they who engross almost the whole reason of the species, who are born to instruct, to guide, and to preserve; who are designed to be the tutors and the guardians of human kind. When they prove such, they exhibit to us examples of the highest virtue, and the truest piety: and they deserve to have their festivals kept, instead of that pack of *Anachorites* and *Enthusiasts*, with whose names the calendar is crowded and disgraced. When these men apply their talents to other purposes, when they strive to be great and despise being good, they commit a most sacrilegious breach of trust; they pervert the means, they defeat as far as lies in them, the designs of providence, and disturb in some sort the system of infinite wisdom. To misapply these talents is the most diffused, and therefore the



OF PATRIOTISM.

11

the greatest of crimes in it's nature and consequences ; but to keep them unexercised, and unemployed, is a crime too. Look about you, my Lord, from the palace to the cottage ; you will find that the bulk of mankind is made to breathe the air of this atmosphere, to roam about this globe, and to consume, like the courtiers of *Alcinous*, the fruits of the earth. *Nos numerus sumus & fruges consumere nati*. When they have trod this insipid round a certain number of years, and begot others to do the same after them, they have lived : and if they have performed in some tolerable degree, the ordinary moral duties of life, they have done all they were born to do. Look about you again, my Lord, nay look into your own breast, and you will find that there are superior spirits, men who shew even from their infancy, tho' it be not always perceived by others, perhaps not always felt by themselves, that they were born for something more, and better. These are the men to whom the part I mentioned is assigned. Their talents denote their *general designation*, and the opportunities of conforming themselves to it, that arise in the course of things, or that are presented to them by any circumstances of rank and situation in the society to which they belong, denote the *particular*

vocation which it is not lawful for them to resist, nor even to neglect. The duration of the lives of such men as these is to be determined, I think, by the length and importance of the parts they act, not by the number of years that pass between their coming into the world, and their going out of it. Whether the piece be of three, or five acts, the part may be long: and he who sustains it thro the whole may be said to die in the fulness of years; whilst he, who declines it sooner, may be said not to live out half his days.

I have sometimes represented to myself the *Vulgar*, who are accidentally distinguished by the titles of king and subject, of lord and vassal, of nobleman and peasant; and the *few* who are distinguished by nature so essentially from the herd of mankind, that (figure apart) they seem to be of another species, in this manner. The former come into the world and continue in it like *Dutch travellers* in a foreign country. Every thing they meet has the grace of novelty: and they are fond alike of every thing that is new. They wander about from one object to another, of vain curiosity, or inelegant pleasure. If they are industrious, they shew their industry in copying signs, and collecting mottos
and

and epitaphs. They loiter, or they trifle away their whole time : and their presence or their absence would be equally unperceived, if caprice or accident did not raise them often to stations, wherein their stupidity, their vices, or their follies, make them a public misfortune. The latter come into the world, or at least continue in it after the effects of surprize and inexperience are over, like men who are sent on more important errands. They observe with distinction, they admire with knowledge. They may indulge themselves in pleasure ; but as their industry is not employed about trifles, so their amusements are not made the business of their lives. Such men cannot pass unperceived thro' a country. If they retire from the world, their splendor accompanies them, and enlightens even the obscurity of their retreat. If they take a part in public life, the effect is never indifferent. They either appear like ministers of divine vengeance, and their course thro' the world is marked by desolation and oppression, by poverty and servitude : or they are the guardian angels of the country they inhabit, busy to avert even the most distant evil, and to maintain or to procure peace, plenty, and the greatest of human blessings, liberty.

From

From the observation, that superiority of parts is often employed to do superior mischief, no consequence can be drawn against the truth I endeavour to establish. Reason collects the will of God from the constitution of things, in this as in other cases; but in no case does the Divine power impel us necessarily to conform ourselves to this will: and therefore from the misapplication of superior parts to the hurt, no argument can be drawn against this position, that they were given for the good of mankind. Reason deceives us not: we deceive ourselves, and suffer our wills to be determined by other motives. MONTAIGNE or CHARRON would say, *l'homme se pipe*, 'man is at once his own sharper, and his own bubble.' Human nature is her own bawd, says TULLY, *Blanda conciliatrix & quasi lena sui*. He who considers the universal wants, imperfections and vices of his kind, must agree that men were intended not only for society, but to unite in commonwealths, and submit to laws. *Legum idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus*. And yet this very man will be seduced by his own passions, or the passions and examples of others, to think, or to act as if he thought, the very contrary. So he who is conscious
of

of superior endowments, such as render him more capable than the generality of men to secure and improve the advantages of social life, by preserving the commonwealth in strength and splendor, even he may be seduced to think, or to act as if he thought, that these endowments were given him for the gratification of his ambition, and his other passions; and that there is no difference between vice and virtue, between a knave and an honest man, but one which a prince, who died not many years ago, asserted, 'that men of great sense were therefore knaves, and men of little sense were therefore honest.' But in neither of these cases will the truth and reason of things be altered, by such examples of human frailty. It will be still true, and reason will still demonstrate, that all men are directed by the general constitution of human nature, to submit to government; and that some men are in a particular manner designed to take care of that government on which the common happiness depends. The use that reason will make of such examples will be only this, that since men are so apt, in every form of life and every degree of understanding, to act against their interest and their duty too, without benevolence to mankind, or regard to the divine will; it is the more incumbent on those,

those, who have this benevolence and this regard at heart, to employ all the means that the nature of the government allows, and that rank, circumstances of situations, or superiority of talents, give them, to oppose evil, and promote good government; and contribute thus to preserve the moral system of the world, at that point of imperfection at least, which seems to have been prescribed to it by the great Creator of every system of beings.

Give me leave now, my Lord, to cast my eyes for a moment homeward, and to apply what I have been saying to the present state of *Britain*. That there is no profusion of the ethereal spirit to be observed among us, and that we do not abound with men of superior genius, I am ready to confess; but I think there is no ground for the complaints I have heard made, as if nature had not done her part in our age, as well as in former ages, by producing men capable of serving the commonwealth. The manners of our fore-fathers were, I believe, in many respects better: they had more probity perhaps, they had certainly more show of honour, and greater industry. But still nature sows alike, tho' we do not reap alike. There are, and as there always have

have been, there always will be such creatures in government as I have described above. Fortune maintains a kind of rivalry with wisdom, and piques herself often in favour of fools as well as knaves. SOCRATES used to say, that altho' no man undertakes a trade he has not learned, even the meanest; yet every one thinks himself sufficiently qualified for the hardest of all trades, that of government. He said this upon the experience he had in *Greece*. He would not change his opinion if he lived now in *Britain*. But however, such characters as these would do little hurt, generally speaking, or would not do it long, if they stood alone. To do great hurt, some genius, some knowledge, some talents in short, natural or acquired, are necessary: less indeed, far less than are required, to do good, but always some. Yet I imagine, not the worst minister could do all the mischief he does by the misapplication of his talents alone, if it were not for the misapplication of much better talents than his by some who join with him, and the non-application, or the faint and unsteady exercise of their talents by some who oppose him; as well as the general remissness of mankind in acquiring knowledge, and in improving the parts which God has
given

given them for the service of the public. These are the great springs of national misfortunes. There have been monsters in other ages, and other countries, as well as ours; but they have never continued their devastations long, when there were heroes to oppose them. We will suppose a man impudent, rash, presumptuous, ungracious, insolent and profligate, in speculation as well as practice. He can bribe, but he cannot seduce: he can buy, but he cannot deceive. From whence then has such a man his strength? From the general corruption, of the people, nursed up to a full maturity under his administration; from the venality of all orders and all ranks of men, some of whom are so prostitute, that they set themselves to sale, and even prevent application. This would be the answer, and it would be a true one as far as it goes; but it does not account for the whole. Corruption could not spread with so much success, tho' reduced into system; and tho' some ministers, with equal impudence and folly, avowed it by themselves and their advocates, to be the principal expedient by which they governed, if a long and almost unobserved progression of causes and effects, did not prepare the conjuncture. Let me explain it

it and apply it, as I conceive it. One party had given their whole attention, during several years, to the project of enriching themselves, and impoverishing the rest of the nation; and, by these and other means, of establishing their dominion under the government and with the favour of a family, who were foreigners, and therefore might believe, that they were established on the throne by the good will and strength of this party alone. This party in general were so intent on these views, and many of them, I fear, are so still, that they did not advert in time to the necessary consequences of the measures they abetted: nor did they consider, that the power they raised, and by which they hoped to govern their country, would govern them with the very rod of iron they forged, and would be the power of a prince or minister, not that of a party long. Another party continued sour, sullen, and inactive, with judgments so weak, and passions so strong, that even experience, and a severe one surely, was lost upon them. They waited, like the *Jews*, for a *Messiah*, that may never come; and under whom, if he did come, they would be strangely disappointed in their expectations of glory and triumph, and universal dominion.

Whilst

Whilst they waited, they were marked out like the *Jews*, a distinct race, hewers of wood and drawers of water, scarce members of the community, tho' born in the country. All indifferent men stood as it were at a gaze: and the few, who were jealous of the court, were still more jealous of one another; so that a strength sufficient to oppose bad ministers was not easy to be formed. When this strength was formed, and the insufficiency or iniquity of the administration was daily exposed to public view, many adhered at first to the minister, and others were since gained to his cause, because they knew nothing of the constitution of their own, nor of the history of other countries; but imagined wildly, that things always went as they saw them go, and that liberty has been, and therefore may be preserved under the influence of the same corruption. Others perhaps were weak enough to be frightened at first, as some are hypocritical enough to pretend to be still, with the appellations of Tory and Jacobite, which are always ridiculously given to every man who does not bow to the brazen image that the king has set up. Others again might be persuaded, that no fatal use at least would be made of the power acquired by corruption; and men of superior

perior parts might and may still flatter themselves, that if this power should be so employed, they shall have time and means to stop the effects of it. The first of these are seduced by their ignorance and futility; the second, if they are not hypocrites, by their prejudices; the third, by their partiality and blind confidence; the last, by their presumption; and all of them by the mammon of unrighteousness, their private interest, which they endeavour to palliate and to reconcile as well as they can to that of the public: *Et cæca cupiditate corrupti, non intelligunt se, dum vendunt, & vānire.*

According to this representation, which I take to be true, your Lordship will agree that our unfortunate country affords an example in proof of what is asserted above. The *Dutch* travellers I spoke of, men of the ordinary, or below the ordinary size of understanding, tho' they are called by caprice, or lifted any other way into power, cannot do great and long mischief, in a country of liberty; unless men of genius, knowledge, and experience; misapply these talents, and become their leaders. A ministerial faction would have as little ability to hurt, as they have inclination to do good, if they were not formed and conducted by one of better parts
than

than they: nor would such a minister be able to support, at the head of this trusty phalanx, the ignominious tyranny imposed on his country, if other men, of better parts and much more consequence than himself, were not drawn in to misapply these parts to the vilest drudgery imaginable; the daily drudgery of explaining folly, concealing and even justifying fraud and corruption; instead of employing their knowledge, their elocution, their skill, experience and authority, to correct the administration and to guard the constitution. But this is not all: the example shews a great deal more. Your Lordship's experience as well as mine will justify what I am going to say. It shews further, that such a conjuncture could not be rendered effectual to preserve power in some of the weakest and some of the worst hands in the kingdom, if there was not a non-application, or a faint and unsteady exercise of parts on one side, as well as an iniquitous misapplication of them on the other: and I cannot help saying, let it fall where it will, what I have said perhaps already, that the former is a crime but one degree inferior to the latter. The more genius, industry, and spirit are employed to destroy, the harder the task
of

of saving our country becomes; but the duty increases with the difficulty, if the principles on which I reason are true. In such exigences it is not enough that *genius* be opposed to *genius*, *spirit* must be matched by *spirit*. They who go about to destroy, are animated from the first by ambition and avarice, the love of power and of money: fear makes them often desperate at last. They must be opposed therefore, or they will be opposed in vain, by a spirit able to cope with ambition, avarice, and despair itself: by a spirit able to cope with these passions, when they are favoured and fortified by the weakness of a nation, and the strength of a government. In such exigences there is little difference, as to the merit or the effect, between opposing faintly and unsteadily, and not opposing at all: nay the former may be of worse consequence in certain circumstances than the latter. And this is a truth I wish with all my heart you may not see verified in our country, where many, I fear, undertake opposition not as a *duty*, but as an *adventure*: and looking on themselves like volunteers, not like men listed in the service, they deem themselves at liberty to take as much or as little of this trouble, and to continue in it as long, or end it as soon as they please. It is but a few years ago,

ago, that not the merchants alone, but the whole nation, took fire at the project of new excises. The project was opposed, not on mercantile considerations and interests alone, but on the true principles of liberty. In parliament, the opposition was strenuously enough supported for a time ; but there was so little disposition to guide and improve the spirit, that the chief concern of those who took the lead seemed applied to keep it down ; and yet your Lordship remembers how high it continued against the projector ; till it was calmed just before the elections of the present parliament, by the remarkable indolence and inactivity of the last session of the last. But these friends of ours, my Lord, are as much mistaken in their ethics, as the event will shew they have been in their politics.

The service of our country is no chimerical, but a real duty. He who admits the proofs of any other moral duty, drawn from the constitution of human nature, or from the moral fitness and unfitness of things, must admit them in favour of this duty, or be reduced to the most absurd inconsistency. When he has once admitted the duty on these proofs, it will be no difficult matter to demonstrate to him,

him, that his obligation to the performance of it is in proportion to the means and the opportunities he has of performing it; and that nothing can discharge him from this obligation as long as he has these means and these opportunities in his power, and as long as his country continues in the same want of his services. These obligations then to the public service may become obligations for life on certain persons. No doubt they may: and shall this consideration become a reason for denying or evading them? On the contrary, sure it should become a reason for acknowledging and fulfilling them, with the greatest gratitude to the Supreme Being, who has made us capable of acting so excellent a part, and of the utmost benevolence to mankind. Superior talents, and superior rank amongst our fellow-creatures, whether acquired by birth, or by the course of accidents, and the success of our own industry, are noble prerogatives. Shall he who possesses them repine at the obligation they lay him under, of passing his whole life in the noblest occupation of which human nature is capable? To what higher station, to what greater glory can any mortal aspire, than to be, during the whole

B

course

course of his life, the support of good, the controul of bad government, and the guardian of public liberty? To be driven from hence by successful tyranny, by loss of health or of parts, or by the force of accidents, is to be degraded in such a manner as to deserve pity, and not to incur blame: but to degrade ourselves, to descend voluntarily, and by choice, from the highest to a lower, perhaps to the lowest rank among the sons of ADAM; to abandon the government of men for that of hounds and horses, the care of a kingdom for that of a parish, and a scene of great and generous efforts in public life, for one of trifling amusements and low cares, of sloth and of idleness, what is it, my Lord? I had rather your Lordship should name it than I. Will it be said that it is hard to exact from some men, in favour of others, that they should renounce all the pleasures of life, and drudge all their days in business, that others may indulge themselves in ease? It will be said without grounds. A life dedicated to the service of our country admits the full use, and no life should admit the abuse, of pleasures: the least are consistent with a constant discharge of our public duty, the greatest
arise

arise from it. The common, the sensual pleasures to which nature prompts us, and which reason therefore does not forbid, tho' she should always direct, are so far from being excluded out of a life of business, that they are sometimes necessary in it, and are always heightened by it: those of the table, for instance, may be ordered so as to promote that which the elder CATO calls *vita conjunctionem*. In the midst of public duties, private studies, and an extreme old age, he found time to frequent the *sodalitates*, or clubs of friends at Rome, and to sit up all night with his neighbours in the country of the *Sabines*. CATO's virtue often glowed with wine: and the love of women did not hinder CÆSAR from forming and executing the greatest projects that ambition ever suggested. But if CÆSAR, whilst he laboured to destroy the liberties of his country, enjoyed these inferior pleasures of life, which a man who labours to save those liberties may enjoy as well as he; there are superior pleasures in a busy life that CÆSAR never knew, those, I mean, that arise from a faithful discharge of our duty to the commonwealth. Neither MONTAIGNE in writing his essays, nor DES CARTES in building new worlds, nor BURNET in framing

framing an antedeluvian earth, no nor NEWTON in discovering and establishing the true laws of nature on experiment and a sublimer geometry, felt more intellectual joys, than he feels who is a *real patriot*, who bends all the force of his understanding, and directs all his thoughts and actions, to the good of his country. When such a man forms a political scheme, and adjusts various and seemingly independent parts in it to one great and good design, he is transported by imagination, or absorbed in meditation, as much and as agreeably as they : and the satisfaction that arises from the different importance of these objects, in every step of the work, is vastly in his favour. It is here that the speculative philosopher's labour and pleasure end. But he who speculates in order to *act*, goes on, and carries his scheme into execution. His labour continues, it varies, it increases ; but so does his pleasure too. The execution indeed is often traversed, by unforeseen and untoward circumstances, by the perverseness or treachery of friends, and by the power and malice of enemies : but the first and the last of these animate, and the docility and fidelity of some men make amends for the perverseness and treachery of others.

Whilst

Whilst a great event is in suspense, the action warms, and the very suspense, made up of hope and fear, maintains no unpleasing agitation in the mind. If the event is decided successfully, such a man enjoys pleasure proportionable to the good he has done; a pleasure like to that which is attributed to the Supreme Being, on a survey of his works. If the event is decided otherwise, and usurping courts, or overbearing parties prevail, such a man has still the testimony of his conscience, and a sense of the honour he has acquired, to soothe his mind, and support his courage. For altho' the course of state-affairs be to those who meddle in them like a lottery, yet it is a lottery wherein no good man can be a loser: he may be reviled, it is true, instead of being applauded, and may suffer violence of many kinds. I will not say, like *SENECA*, that the noblest spectacle which God can behold, is a virtuous man suffering, and struggling with afflictions: but this I will say, that the second *CATO* driven out of the forum, and dragged to prison, enjoyed more inward pleasure, and maintained more outward dignity, than they who insulted him, and who triumphed in the ruin of their country. But the very example of *CATO*

may be urged perhaps against what I have insisted upon : it may be asked, what good he did to *Rome*, by dedicating his whole life to her service, what honour to himself by dying at *Utica*? It may be said, that governments have their periods like all things human ; that they may be brought back to their primitive principles during a certain time, but that when these principles are worn out, in the minds of men, it is a vain enterprize to endeavour to renew them : that this is the case of all governments, when the corruption of the people comes to a great pitch, and is grown universal : that when a house which is old, and quite decayed, tho' often repaired, not only cracks, but totters even from the foundations, every man in his senses runs out of it, and takes shelter where he can, and that none but madmen continue obstinate to repair what is irreparable, till they are crushed in the ruin. Just so, that we must content ourselves to live under the government we like the least, when that form which we like the most is destroyed, or worn out ; according to the counsel of *DOLABELLA* in one of his letters to *CICERO*. But, my Lord, if *CATO* could not save, he prolonged the life of liberty : the liberties of *Rome* would have

have been lost when CATILINE attacked them, abetted probably by CÆSAR and CRASSUS, and the worst Citizens of *Rome*; and when CICERO defended them, abetted by CATO and the best. That CATO erred in his conduct, by giving way too much to the natural roughness of his temper, and by allowing too little for that of the *Romans*, among whom luxury had long prevailed, and corruption was openly practised, is most true. He was incapable of employing those seeming compliances that are reconcileable to the greatest steadiness, and treated unskilfully a crazy constitution. The safety of the commonwealth depended, in that critical conjuncture, on a coalition of parties, the senatorian and the equestrian: TULLY had formed it, CATO broke it. But if this good, for I think he was not an able man, erred in the particular respects I have ventured to mention, he deserved most certainly the glory he acquired by the general tenor of his conduct, and by dedicating the whole labour of his life to the service of his country. He would have deserved more if he had persisted in maintaining the same cause to the end, and would have died I think with a better grace at *Munda* than at *Utica*. If this be so, if CATO may be cen-

fured, severely indeed, but justly, for abandoning the cause of liberty, which he would not however survive; what shall we say of those, who embrace it faintly, pursue it irresolutely, grow tired of it when they have much to hope, and give it up when they have nothing to fear?

My Lord, I have insisted the more on this duty which men owe to their country, because I came out of *England*, and continue still, strongly affected with what I saw when I was there. Our government has approached, nearer than ever before, to the true principles of it, since the revolution of one thousand six hundred and eighty eight: and the accession of the present family to the throne, has given the fairest opportunities, as well as the justest reasons, for completing the scheme of liberty, and improving it to perfection. But it seems to me, that, in our separate world, as the means of asserting and supporting liberty are increased, all concern for it is diminished. I beheld, when I was among you, more abject servility, in the manners and behaviour of particular men, than I ever saw in *France*, or than has been seen there, I believe, since the days of that *Gascon*, who, being turned
out

out of the minister's door, leaped in again at his window. As to bodies of men, I dare challenge your Lordship, and I am sorry for it, to produce any instances of resistance to the unjust demands, or wanton will of a court, that *British* parliaments have given, comparable to such as I am able to cite to the honour of the *parliament of Paris*, and the whole body of the law in that country, within the same compass of time. This abject servility may appear justly the more wonderful in *Britain*, because the government of *Britain* has, in some sort, the appearance of an oligarchy: and monarchy is rather hid behind it than shewn, rather weakened than strengthened, rather imposed upon than obeyed. The wonder therefore is to observe, how imagination and custom, (a giddy fool and a formal Pedant) have rendered these cabals, or oligarchies, more respected than majesty itself. That this should happen in countries where princes, who have absolute power, may be tyrants themselves, or substitute subordinate tyrants, is not wonderful. It has happened often: but that it should happen in *Britain*, may be justly an object of wonder. In these countries, the people had lost the armour of their constitution: they were naked and

defenceless. Ours is more compleat than ever. But tho' we have preserved the *armour*, we have lost the *spirit* of our constitution: and therefore we bear, from little engrossers of delegated power, what our fathers would not have suffered from true proprietors of the royal authority. Parliaments are not only what they always were, essential parts of our constitution, but essential Parts of our administration too. They do not claim the executive power. No. But the executive power cannot be exercised without their annual concurrence. How few months, instead of years, have princes, and ministers now, to pass without inspection and controul? How *easy* therefore is it become to check every growing evil in the bud, to change every bad administration, to keep such farmers of government in awe, to maintain and revenge, if need be, the constitution? It is become so easy by the present form of our government, that corruption *alone* could not destroy us. We must want *spirit*, as well as *virtue*, to perish. Even able knaves would preserve liberty in such circumstances as ours, and highwaymen would scorn to receive the wages and do the drudgery of pickpockets. But all is little, and low, and mean
among

among us ! Far from having the *virtues*, we have not even the *vices* of great men. He who had pride instead of vanity, and ambition but equal to his desire of wealth, could never bear, I do not say to be the understrapper to any farmer of royal authority, but to see patiently one of them (at best his fellow, perhaps his inferior in every respect) lord it over him, and the rest of mankind, dissipating wealth, and trampling on the liberties of his country, with impunity. This could not happen, if there was the least spirit among us. But there is none. What passes among us for ambition, is an odd mixture of avarice and vanity : the moderation we have seen practised is pusillanimity, and the philosophy that some men affect is sloth. Hence it comes that corruption has spread, and prevails.

I expect little from the principal actors that tread the stage at present. They are divided, not so much as it has seemed, and as they would have it believed, about *measures* : the true division is about their different *ends*. Whilst the minister was not hard pushed, nor the prospect of succeeding to him near, they appeared to have but one end, the reformation of the

government. The destruction of the minister was pursued only as a preliminary, but of essential and indispensable necessity to that end. But when his destruction seemed to approach, the *object* of his *succession* interposed to the sight of many, and the *reformation* of the *government* was no longer their point of view. They divided the skin, at least in their thoughts, before they had taken the beast, and the common fear of hunting him down for others made them all faint in the chace. It was *this*, and this alone, that *has* saved him, or *has* put off his evil day. Corruption, so much, and so justly complained of, could not have done it *alone*.

When I say that I expect little from the principal actors that tread the stage at present, I am far from applying to all of them what I take to be true of the far greatest part. There are men among them who certainly intend the good of their country, and whom I love and honour for that reason. But these men have been clogged, or misled, or overborne by others; and, seduced by natural temper to inactivity, have taken any excuse, or yielded to any pretence that favoured it. That they should rouse there-
fore

fore in themselves, or in any one else, the spirit they have suffered, nay helped to dye away, I do not expect. I turn my eyes from the generation that is going off, to the generation that is coming on the stage. I expect good from them, and from none of them more than from you, my Lord. Remember that the opposition in which you have engaged, at your first entrance into business, is not an opposition only to a bad administration of public affairs, but to an administration that supports itself by means, establishes principles, introduces customs repugnant to the constitution of our government, and destructive of all liberty; that you do not only combat present evils, but attempts to entail these evils upon you and your posterity; that if you cease the combat, you give up the cause: and that he, who does not renew on every occasion his claim, may forfeit his right.

Our disputes were formerly, to say the truth, much more about persons than things; or at most about particular points of political conduct, in which we should have soon agreed, if persons, and personal interests had been less concerned, and the blind prejudice of party less prevalent.

Whether

Whether the *Big-endians* or the *Little-endians* got the better, I believe no man of sense and knowledge thought the constitution concerned; notwithstanding all the clamour raised at one time about the *danger* of the *church*, and at another about the *danger* of the *protestant succession*. But the case is at this time vastly altered. The means of invading liberty more effectually by the constitution of the *revenue*, than it ever had been invaded by *prerogative*, were not then grown up into strength. They are so now; and a bold and insolent use is made of them. To reform the *state* therefore is, and ought to be, the object of your opposition, as well as to reform the *administration*. Why do I say as well? It is so, and it ought to be so, much more. Wrest the power of the government, if you can, out of hands that have employed it weakly and wickedly, ever since it was thrown into them, by a silly bargain made in one reign, and a corrupt bargain made in another. But do not imagine this to be your sole, or your principal business. You owe to your country, to your honour, to your security, to the present, and to future ages, that no endeavours of your's be wanting to repair the breach that is made, and is increasing

increasing daily in the constitution, and to shut up with all the bars and bolts of law, the principal entries thro' which these torrents of corruption have been let in upon us. I say the *principal* entries; because, however it may appear in pure speculation, I think it would not be found in practice possible, no nor eligible neither, to shut them up *all*. As entries of corruption none of them deserve to be excepted: but there is a just distinction to be made, because there is a real difference. *Some* of these entries are opened by the abuse of powers, necessary to maintain subordination, and to carry on even good government, and therefore necessary to be preserved in the crown, notwithstanding the abuse that is sometimes made of them; for no human institution can arrive at perfection, and the most that human wisdom can do, is to procure the same or greater good, at the expence of less evil. There will be always some evil either immediate, or remote, either in cause or consequence. But there are *other* entries of corruption, and these are by much the greatest, for suffering of which to continue open no reason can be assigned, or has been pretended to be assigned, but that which is to every honest and wise man a reason for shutting them up;
the

the increase of the means of corruption, which are oftener employed for the service of the oligarchy, than for the service of the monarchy. Shut up *these*, and you will have nothing to fear from the *others*. By *these*, a more real and a more dangerous power has been gained to ministers, than was lost to the crown by the restraints on prerogative.

There have been periods when our government continued free, with strong appearances of becoming absolute. Let it be your glory, my Lord, and that of the new generation springing up with you, that this government do not become absolute at any future period, with the appearances of being free. However you may be employed; in all your councils, in all your actions, keep this regard to the constitution always in sight. The scene that opens before you is great, and the part that you will have to act difficult. It is difficult indeed to bring men, from strong habits of corruption, to prefer honour to profit, and liberty to luxury; as it is hard to teach princes the great art of governing all by all, or to prevail on them to practise it. But if it be a difficult, it is a glorious attempt; an attempt worthy to exert the greatest talents, and
to

to fill the most extended life. Pursue it with courage, my Lord, nor despair of success.

— *Deus hæc fortasse benigna
Reducet in sedem Vice.*

A parliament, nay one house of parliament, is able at any time, and at once, to destroy any corrupt plan of power. Time produces every day new conjunctures: Be prepared to improve them. We read in the old testament of a city that might have escaped divine vengeance, if five righteous men had been found in it. Let not our city perish for want of so small a number: and if the generation that is going off could not furnish it, let the generation that is coming on furnish a greater.

We may reasonably hope that it will, from the first essays which your Lordship, and some others of our young senators, have made in public life. You have raised the hopes of your country by the proofs you have given of superior parts. Confirm these hopes by proofs of uncommon industry and application, and perseverance. Superior parts, nay even superior
virtue,

virtue, without these qualities, will be insufficient to support your character and your cause. How many men have appeared in my time who have made these essays with success, and have made no progress afterwards? Some have dropped, from their first flights, down into the vulgar crowd, have been distinguished, nay, heard of no more! Others with better parts, perhaps with more presumption, but certainly with greater ridicule, have persisted in making these essays towards business all their lives, and have never been able to advance farther, in their political course, than a premeditated harangue on some choice subject. I never saw one of these important persons sit down after his oration, with repeated hear-hims ringing in his ears, and inward rapture glowing in his eyes, that he did not recal to my memory the story of a conceited member of some parliament in *France*, who was overheard, after his tedious harangue, muttering most devoutly to himself, *Non nobis, Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam!*

Eloquence, that leads mankind by the ears, gives a nobler superiority than power that every dunce may use, or fraud that every

every knave may employ, to lead them by the nose. But eloquence must flow like a stream that is fed by an abundant spring, and not spout forth a little frothy water on some gaudy day, and remain dry the rest of the year. The famous orators of *Greece* and *Rome* were the statesmen and ministers of those commonwealths. The nature of their governments and the humour of those ages made elaborate orations necessary. They harangued oftner than they debated: and the *ars dicendi* required more study and more exercise of mind and of body too, among them, than are necessary among us. But as much pains as they took in learning how to conduct the stream of eloquence, they took more to enlarge the fountain from which it flowed. Hear DEMOSTHENES, hear CICERO thunder against PHILIP, CATILINE, and ANTHONY. I chuse the example of the first rather than that of PERICLES whom he imitated, or of PHOCION whom he opposed, or of any other considerable personage in *Greece*; and the example of CICERO rather than that of CRASSUS, or of HORTENSIVS, or of any other of the great men of *Rome*; because the eloquence of these two has been so celebrated that

that we are accustomed to look upon them almost as *meer orators*. They were orators indeed, and no man who has a soul can read their orations, after the revolution of so many ages, after the extinction of the governments, and of the people for whom they were composed, without feeling at this hour the passions they were designed to move, and the spirit they were designed to raise. But if we look into the history of these two men, and consider the parts they acted, we shall see them in another light, and admire them in an higher sphere of action. DEMOSTHENES had been neglected, in his education, by the same tutors who cheated him of his inheritance. CICERO was bred with greater advantage: and PLUTARCH, I think, says that when he first appeared the people used to call him, by way of derision, the *Greek*, and the scholar. But whatever advantage of this kind the latter might have over the former, and to which of them soever you ascribe the superior genius, the progress which both of them made in every part of *political knowledge*, by their industry and application, was marvellous. CICERO might be a better philosopher, but DEMOSTHENES was no less a statesman: and both of them performed

formed actions and acquired fame, above the reach of eloquence alone. DEMOSTHENES used to compare eloquence to a weapon, aptly enough; for eloquence, like every other weapon, is of little use to the owner, unless he have the force and the skill to use it. This force and this skill DEMOSTHENES had in an eminent degree. Observe them in one instance among many. It was of mighty importance to PHILIP to prevent the accession of *Thebes* to the grand alliance that DEMOSTHENES, at the head of the *Athenian* commonwealth, formed against the growing power of the *Macedonians*. PHILIP had emissaries and his ambassadors on the spot to oppose to those of *Athens*, and we may be assured that he neglected none of those arts upon this occasion that he employed so successfully on others. The struggle was great, but DEMOSTHENES prevailed, and the *Thebans* engaged in the war against PHILIP. Was it by his eloquence alone that he prevailed in a divided state, over all the subtilty of intrigue, all the dexterity of negotiation, all the seduction, all the corruption, and all the terror that the ablest and most powerful prince could employ? Was DEMOSTHENES wholly taken up with composing orations, and haranguing the people, in
this

this remarkable crisis? He harangued them no doubt at *Thebes*, as well as at *Athens*, and in the rest of *Greece*, where all the great resolutions of making alliances, waging war, or concluding peace, were determined in democratical assemblies. But yet haranguing was no doubt the least part of his business, and eloquence was neither the sole, nor the principal talent, as the style of writers would induce us to believe, on which his success depended. He must have been master of other arts, subserviently to which his eloquence was employed, and must have had a thorough knowledge of his own state, and of the other states of *Greece*, of their dispositions, and of their interests relatively to one another, and relatively to their neighbours, to the *Persians* particularly, with whom he held a correspondence not much to his honour: I say, he must have been master of many other arts, and have possessed an immense fund of knowledge, to make his eloquence in every case successful, and even pertinent or seasonable in some, as well as to direct it, and to furnish it with matter whenever he thought proper to employ this weapon.

Let

Let us consider TULLY on the greatest theatre of the known world, and in the most difficult circumstances. We are better acquainted with him than we are with DEMOSTHENES; for we see him nearer, as it were, and in more different lights. How perfect a knowledge had he acquired of the *Roman* constitution of government, ecclesiastical and civil; of the original and progress, of the general reasons and particular occasions of the laws and customs of his country; of the great rules of equity and the low practice of Courts; of the duty of every magistracy and office in the state, from the dictator down to the lictor; and of all the steps by which *Rome* had risen from her infancy, to liberty, to power, and grandeur, and dominion, as well as of all those by which she began to decline, a little before his age, to that servitude which he died for opposing, but lived to see established, and in which not her liberty alone, but her power, and grandeur, and dominion were lost? How well was he acquainted with the *Roman* colonies and provinces, with the allies and enemies of the empire, with the rights and privileges of the former, the dispositions and conditions of the latter, with

with the interests of them all relatively to *Rome*, and with the interests of *Rome* relatively to them? How present to his mind were the anecdotes of former times concerning the *Roman* and other states, and how curious was he to observe the minutest circumstances that passed in his own? His works will answer sufficiently the questions I ask, and establish in the mind of every man who reads them the idea I would give of his capacity and knowledge, as well as that which is so universally taken of his eloquence. To a man fraught with all this stock of knowledge, and industrious to improve it daily, nothing could happen that was entirely new, nothing for which he was quite unprepared, scarce any effect whereof he had not considered the cause, scarce any cause wherein his sagacity could not discern the latent effect. His eloquence in private causes gave him first credit at *Rome*, but it was this knowledge, this experience, and the continued habits of business, that supported his reputation, enabled him to do so much service to his country, and gave force and authority to his eloquence. To little purpose would he have attacked *CATILINE* with all the vehemence that indignation and even fear added

added to eloquence, if he had trusted to this weapon alone. This weapon alone would have secured neither him nor the senate from the poniard of that assassin. He would have had no occasion to boast, that he had driven this infamous citizen out of the walls of *Rome*, *abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit*, if he had not made it before-hand impossible for him to continue any longer in them. As little occasion would he have had to assume the honour of defeating without any tumult, or any disorder, the designs of those who conspired to murder the *Roman* people, to destroy the *Roman* empire, and to extinguish the *Roman* name; if he had not united by skill and management, in the common cause of their country, orders of men the most averse to each other; if he had not watched all the machinations of the conspirators in silence, and prepared a strength sufficient to resist them at *Rome*, and in the provinces, before he opened this scene of villany to the senate and the people: in a word, if he had not made much more use of political prudence, that is, of the knowledge of mankind, and of the arts of government, which study and experience give, than of all the powers of his eloquence.

Such was DEMOSTHENES, such was CICERO, such were all the great men whose memories are preserved in history, and such must every man be, or endeavour to be, if he has either sense or sentiment, who presumes to meddle in affairs of government, of a free government I mean, and hopes to maintain a distinguished character in popular assemblies, whatever part he takes, whether that of supporting, or that of opposing. I put the two cases purposely, my Lord, because I have observed, and your Lordship will have frequent occasions of observing, many persons who seem to think that opposition to an administration requires fewer preparatives, and less constant application than the conduct of it. Now, my Lord, I take this to be a gross error, and I am sure it has been a fatal one. It is one of those errors, and there are many such, which men impute to judgment, and which proceed from the defect of judgment, as this does from lightness, irresolution, laziness, and a false notion of opposition; unless the persons, who seem to think, do not really think in this manner, but serving the public purely for interest, and not for fame, nor for duty, decline taking the same pains when they oppose

oppose without personal and immediate reward, as they are willing to take when they are paid for serving. Look about you, and you will see men eager to speak, and keen to act, when particular occasions press them, or particular motives excite them, but quite unprepared for either: and hence all that superficiality in speaking, for want of information, hence all that confusion or inactivity, for want of concert, and all that disappointment for want of preliminary measures. They who affect to head an opposition, or to make any considerable figure in it, must be equal at least to those whom they oppose; I do not say in parts only, but in application and industry, and the fruits of both, information, knowledge, and a certain constant preparedness for all the events that may arise. Every administration is a system of conduct: opposition therefore, should be a system of conduct likewise; an opposite, but not a dependent system. I shall explain myself better by an example. When two armies take the field, the generals on both sides have their different plans for the campaign, either of defence or of offence; and as the former does not suspend his measures till he is attacked, but takes them

beforehand on every probable contingency, so the latter does not suspend his, till the opportunity of attacking presents itself, but is alert and constantly ready to seize it whenever it happens; and in the mean time is busy to improve all the advantages of skill, of force, or of any other kind that he has, or that he can acquire, independently of the plan and of the motions of his enemy.

In a word, my Lord, this is my notion, and I submit it to you. According to the present form of our constitution, every member of either house of parliament is a member of a national standing council, born, or appointed by the people, to promote good, and to oppose bad government; and, if not vested with the power of a minister of state, yet vested with the superior power of controuling those who are appointed such by the crown. It follows from hence, that they who engage in opposition are under as great obligations, to prepare themselves to controul, as they who serve the crown are under, to prepare themselves to carry on the administration: and that a party formed for this purpose, do not act like good citizens nor honest men, unless they *propose true*, as well as *oppose false* measures

fures of government. Sure I am they do not act like wise men unless they act systematically, and unless they contrast, on every occasion, that scheme of policy which the public interest requires to be followed, with that which is suited to no interest but the private interest of the prince or his ministers. Cunning men (several such there are among you) will dislike this consequence, and object, that such a conduct would support, under the appearance of opposing, a weak and even a wicked administration; and that to proceed in this manner would be to give good counsel to a bad minister, and to extricate him out of distresses that ought to be improved to his ruin. But cunning pays no regard to virtue, and is but the low mimic of wisdom. It were easy to demonstrate what I have asserted concerning the duty of an opposing party: and I presume there is no need of labouring to prove, that a party who opposed, systematically, a wise to a silly, an honest to an iniquitous, scheme of government, would acquire greater reputation and strength, and arrive more surely at their end, than a party who opposed occasionally, as it were, without any common system, without any general con-

cert, with little uniformity, little preparation, little perseverance, and as little knowledge or political capacity. But it is time to leave this invidious subject, and to hasten to the conclusion of my letter before it grows into a book.

I am, my LORD, &c.

LETTER

LETTER II.

The IDEA of

A PATRIOT KING.

LETTER II

The first of

A PATRIOT KING

The IDEA of A PATRIOT KING.

INTRODUCTION.

Dec. 1. 1738.

REvising some letters I writ to my Lord * * *, I found in one of them a great deal said concerning the *du-ties* which men owe to their *country*, those men particularly who live under a *free constitution* of government; with a strong application of these general doctrines to the *present state* of *Great Britain*, and to the *characters* of the present actors on this stage.

I saw no reason to alter, none even to soften, any thing that is there advanced.

On the contrary, it came into my mind to carry these considerations further, and to delineate, for I pretend not to make a perfect draught, the *duties of a king to his country*; of those kings particularly who are appointed by the people, for I know of none who are anointed by God, to rule in *limited monarchies*. After which, I proposed to apply the general doctrines in this case, as strongly and as directly as in the other, to the *present state of Great Britain*.

I am not one of those oriental slaves, who deem it unlawful presumption to look their kings in the face; neither am I swayed by my Lord BACON's authority to think this custom good and reasonable in its *meaning*, tho' it favours of barbarism in its *institution*: *Ritu quidem barbarus, sed significatione bonus*. Much otherwise: It seems to me that no secrets are so important to be known, no hearts deserve to be pryed into with more curiosity and attention, than those of princes. But many things have concurred, besides age and temper, to set me at a great distance from the present court. Far from prying into the hearts, I scarce know the faces, of our royal family. I shall therefore decline
all

all application to their characters, and all mention of any influence which their characters may have on their own fortune, or on that of this nation.

The principles I have reasoned upon in my letter to my Lord ***, and those I shall reason upon here, are the same. They are laid in the same system of human nature. They are drawn from that source from whence all the duties of public and private morality must be derived, or they will be often falsely, and always precariously established. Up to this source there are few men who take the pains to go: and, open as it lies, there are not many who can find their way to it. By such as you, I shall be understood; and approved; and far from fearing the censure or the ridicule, I should reproach myself with the applause, of men who measure their interest by their passions, and their duty by the examples of a corrupt age; that is, by the examples they afford to one another. Such I think are the greatest part of the present generation; not of the vulgar alone, but of those who stand foremost, and are raised highest in our nation. Such we may justly apprehend too that the next will be, since they

who are to compose it will set out into the world under a direction that must incline them strongly to the same course of self-interest, profligacy, and corruption.

The iniquity of all the principal men in any community, of kings and ministers especially, does not consist alone in the crimes they commit, and in the immediate consequences of these crimes : and therefore their guilt is not to be measured by these alone. Such men sin against posterity, as well as against their own age : and when the consequences of their crimes are over, the consequences of their example remain. I think, and every wise and honest man in generations yet unborn will think, if the history of ——'s administration descends to blacken our annals, that the greatest iniquity of the minister, on whom the whole iniquity ought to be charged, since he has been so long in possession of the whole power, is the constant endeavour he has employed to corrupt the *morals* of men. I say thus generally the *morals*, because he who abandons or betrays his country, will abandon or betray his friend ; and because he who is prevailed on to act in parliament, without any regard to truth or justice, will easily

easily prevail on himself to act in the same manner every where else. A wiser and honefter administration may relieve our trade from that oppression, and the public from that load of debt under which it must be supposed that he has industriously kept it ; because we are able to prove, by fair calculations, that he might have provided effectually for the payment of it, since he came to the head of the treasury. A wiser and honefter administration may draw us back to our former credit and influence abroad, from that state of contempt into which we are sunk among all our neighbours. But will the *minds of men*, which this minister has narrowed to personal regards alone, will their *views*, which he has confined to the present moment, as if nations were mortal like the men who compose them, and *Britain* was to perish with her degenerate children ; will these, I say, be so *easily* or so *soon* enlarged ? Will their *sentiments*, which are debased from the love of liberty, from zeal for the honour and prosperity of their country, and from a desire of honest fame, to an absolute unconcernedness for all these, to an abject submission, and to a rapacious eagerness after wealth that may sate their avarice,

and

and exceed the profusion of their luxury; will these, I say again, be so *easily*, or so *soon elevated*? In a word, will the *British spirit*, that *spirit* which has preserved liberty hitherto in one corner of the world at least, be so *easily* or so *soon re-infused* into the *British* nation? I think not. We have been long coming to this point of depravation: and the progress from confirmed habits of evil is much more slow than the progress to them. Virtue is not placed on a rugged mountain of difficult and dangerous access, as they who would excuse the indolence of their temper, or the perverseness of their will, desire to have it believed; but she is seated however on an *eminence*. We may go up to her with ease, but we must go up *gradually*, according to the natural progression of *reason*, who is to lead the way, and to guide our steps. On the other hand, if we fall from thence, we are sure to be hurried down the hill with a blind impetuosity, according to the natural violence of those *appetites* and *passions* that caused our fall at first, and urge it on the faster, the further they are removed from the controul that before restrained them.

To

To perform, therefore, so great a work, as to reinfuse the *spirit* of *liberty*, to reform the *morals*, and to raise the *sentiments* of a people, much time is required : and a work which requires so much time may too probably be never compleated ; considering how unsteadily and unsystematically even the best of men are apt often to proceed ; and how this reformation is to be carried forward in opposition to *public fashion*, and *private inclination*, to the *authority* of the men in power, and to the *secret bent* of many of those who are *out* of power. Let us not flatter ourselves ; I did so too long. It is more to be wished than to be hoped, that the contagion should spread no further than that leprous race, who carry on their skins, exposed to public sight, the scabs and blotches of their Distemper. The *minister* preaches corruption aloud and constantly, like an impudent missionary of vice : and some there are who not only insinuate, but teach the same occasionally. I say some ; because I am as far from thinking, that all those who join with him, as that any of those who oppose him, wait only to be more authorized, that they may propagate it with greater success,

success, and apply it to their own use, in their turn.

It seems to me, upon the whole matter, that to save or redeem a nation under such circumstances from perdition, nothing less is necessary than some great, some extraordinary conjuncture of ill fortune, or of good, which may *purge, yet so as by fire*. Distress from abroad, bankruptcy at home, and other circumstances of like nature and tendency, may beget universal Confusion. Out of confusion order may arise : but it may be the order of a wicked tyranny, instead of the order of a just monarchy. Either may happen : and such an alternative, at the disposition of fortune, is sufficient to make a stoic tremble ! We may be saved indeed by means of a very different kind ; but these means will not offer themselves, this way of salvation will not be opened to us without the concurrence, and the influence of a PATRIOT KING, the most uncommon of all phænomena in the physical and moral world.

Nothing can so surely and so effectually restore the virtue and public spirit, essential to the preservation of liberty, and
national

national prosperity, as the reign of such a prince.

We are willing to indulge this pleasing expectation, and there is nothing we desire more ardently than to be able to hold of a *British* prince, without flattery, the same language that was held of a *Roman* emperor, with a great deal,

Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale fatentes.

But let us not neglect, on our part, such means as are in our power, to keep the cause of truth, of reason, of virtue, and of liberty, alive. If the blessing be withheld from us, let us deserve at least that it should be granted to us. If heaven in mercy bestows it on us, let us prepare to receive it, to improve it, and to co-operate with it.

I speak as if I could take my share in these glorious efforts. Neither shall I recal my words. Stripped of the rights of a *British* subject, of all except the meanest of them, that of inheriting, I remember that I am a *Briton* still. I apply to myself what I have read in SENECA, *Officia si civis amiserit, hominis exerceat*. I have renounced

renounced the world, not in shew, but in reality, and more by my way of thinking than by my way of living, as retired as that may seem. But I have not renounced my country, nor my friends; and by my friends I mean all those, and those alone, who are such to their country, by whatever name they have been, or may be still distinguished: and tho' in that number there should be men, of whose past ingratitude, injustice, or malice, I might complain on my own account with the greatest reason. These I will never renounce. In their prosperity, they shall never hear of me; in their distress, always. In that retreat, wherein the remainder of my Days shall be spent, I may be of some use to them: since even from thence I may advise, exhort, and warn them. *Nec enim is solus reipub: prodest, qui candidatos extrahit, & tuetur reos, & de pace belloq; censet; sed qui juventutem exhortatur: qui, in tanta bonorum præceptorum inopia, virtute instruit animos; qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentes, prensat ac retrahit, & si nihil aliud, certe moratur; in privato publicum negotium agit.*

The IDEA of A PATRIOT KING.

MY intention is not to introduce what I have to say concerning the *duties of kings*, by any nice inquiry into the *original* of their institution. What is to be known of it will appear plainly enough, to such as are able and can spare time to trace it, in the broken traditions which are come down to us of a few nations. But those, who are not able to trace it there, may trace something better and more worthy to be known, in their own thoughts: I mean what this institution *ought* to have been, whenever it began, according to the rule of *reason*, founded in the common *rights*, and *interests*, of *mankind*. On this head it is quite necessary to make some reflections, that will, like angular stones laid on a rock, support the little fabric, the model however of a great building, that I propose to raise.

So.

So plain a matter could never have been rendered intricate and voluminous, had it not been for lawless Ambition, extravagant vanity, and the detestable spirit of tyranny; abetted by the private interests of artful men, by adulation and superstition, two vices to which that staring timid creature man is excessively prone; if authority had not imposed on such as did not pretend to reason; and if such as did attempt to reason had not been caught in the common snares of sophism, and bewildered in the labyrinths of disputation. In this case, therefore, as in all those of great concernment, the shortest and the surest method of arriving at real knowledge is to *unlearn* the lessons we have been taught, to *remount* to *first principles*, and take no body's word about *them*; for it is about *them* that almost all the juggling and legerdemain, employed by men whose trade it is to deceive, are set to work.

Now he who does so, in this case, will discover soon, that the notions concerning the *divine institution* and *right* of kings, as well as the *absolute power* belonging to their Office, have no foundation in fact or reason, but have risen from an *old alliance* between *ecclesiastical* and *civil*

civil policy. The characters of king and priest have been sometimes blended together; and when they have been divided, as kings have found the great effects wrought in government by the empire which priests obtain over the consciences of mankind, so priests have been taught by experience, that the best method to preserve their own rank, dignity, wealth, and power, all raised upon a supposed *divine right*, is to communicate the same pretension to kings, and by a fallacy common to both, impose their usurpations on a silly world. This they have done: and in the *state* as in the *church*, these pretensions to a *divine right* have been generally carried highest by those, who have had the least pretension to the *divine favour*.

It is worth while to observe, on what principle some men were advanced to a great pre-eminence over others, in the early ages of those nations that are a little known to us: I speak not of such as raised themselves by *conquest*, but of such as were raised by *common consent*. Now you will find in all these proceedings an entire uniformity of principle. The authors of such inventions as were of general use to the well-being of mankind,

were

were not only revered and obeyed during their lives, but worshipped after their deaths : they became principal Gods, *Dii majorum gentium*. The founders of commonwealths, the law-givers, and the heroes of particular states, became Gods of a second class, *Dii minorum gentium*. All pre-eminence was given in heaven, as well as on earth, in proportion to the benefits that men received. *Majesty* was the first, and *divinity* the second reward. Both were earned by services done to mankind, whom it was easy to lead in those days of simplicity and superstition, from admiration and gratitude, to adoration and expectation.

When advantage had been taken by some particular men of these dispositions in the generality, and religion and government were become two trades or mysteries, new means of attaining to this pre-eminence were soon devised, and new and even contrary motives worked the same effect. Merit had given rank ; but rank was soon kept, and, which is more preposterous, obtained too, without merit. Men were then made *kings* for reasons as little relative to *good government*, as the neighing of the horse of the son of HYSTASPES.

But

But the most prevalent, and the general motive was *proximity of blood*, to the last, not to the best king. Nobility in China mount upwards, and he who has it conferred upon him, enobles his *ancestors*; not his *posterity*. A wise institution! and especially among a people in whose minds a great veneration for their forefathers has been always carefully maintained. But in China, as well as in most other Countries, *royalty* has *descended*, and kingdoms have been reckoned the patrimonies of particular families.

I have read in one of the historians of the latter Roman empire, historians, by the way, that I will not advise others to mispend their time in reading, that SAPHORES the famous king of Persia, against whom JULIAN made the expedition wherein he lost his life, was crowned in his mother's womb. His father left her with child, the magi declared that the child would be a male; whereupon the royal ensigns were brought forth, they were placed on her majesty's Belly, and the princes and the satrapes prostrate recognized the embryo-monarch. But to take a more known example out of multitudes that present themselves, DOMITIAN the worst,

worst, and TRAJAN the best of princes, were promoted to the empire by the *same title*. DOMITIAN was the son of FLAVIUS, and the brother, tho' possibly the poisoner too, of TITUS VESPASIAN: TRAJAN was the adopted son of NERVA. Hereditary right served the purpose of one, as well as of the other: and if TRAJAN was translated to a place among the gods, this was no greater a distinction than some of the worst of his predecessors and his successors obtained, for reasons generally as good as that which SENECA puts into the mouth of DIESPITER in the *apokolokyntosis* of CLAUDIUS, *Cum sit e republica esse aliquem qui cum Romulo possit ferventia rapa vorare*. To say the truth, it would have been a wiser measure to have made these royal persons gods at once: as *gods* they would have done neither good nor hurt; but as emperors, in their way to divinity, they acted like *devils*.

If my readers are ready by this Time to think me antimonarchial, and in particular an enemy to the succession of kings by hereditary right, I hope to be soon restored to their good opinion. I esteem monarchy above any other form of government, and
hereditary

A PATRIOT KING. 78

hereditary monarchy above elective. I reverence kings, their office, their rights, their persons; and it will never be owing to the *principles* I am going to establish, because the character and government of a *patriot king* can be established on no other, if their *office* and their *right* are not always held *divine*, and their *persons* always *sacred*.

Now we are subject, by the constitution of human nature, and therefore by the will of the Author of this and every other nature, to two laws. One given immediately to all men by God, the same to all, and obligatory alike on all. The other given to man by man; and therefore not the same to all, nor obligatory alike on all: founded indeed on the same principles, but varied by different applications of them to times, to characters, and to a number which may be reckoned infinite, of other circumstances. By the first you see, that I mean the universal law of reason; and by the second the particular law, or constitution of laws, by which every distinct community has chosen to be governed.

D

The

The obligation of submission to both, is discoverable by so clear and so simple an use of our intellectual faculties, that it may be said properly enough to be *revealed to us by God*; and tho' *both* these laws cannot be said properly to be given by Him, yet our obligation to submit to the *civil* law is a principal paragraph in the *natural* law, which he has most manifestly given us. In truth we can no more doubt of the obligations of both these laws, than of the existence of the law-giver. As supreme lord over all his works, his *general* providence regards immediately the *great commonwealth* of mankind; but then, as supreme Lord likewise, his authority gives a sanction to the *particular bodies* of law which are made under it. The law of *nature* is the law of *all* his subjects: the constitutions of *particular* governments are like the *by-laws* of cities, or the appropriated customs of provinces. It follows, therefore, that he who breaks the *laws of his country* resists the *ordinance of God*, that is, the law of his nature. God has instituted neither monarchy, nor aristocracy, nor democracy, nor mixed government: but tho' God has instituted no particular form of government among men, yet by the
general

general laws of his kingdom, he exacts our obedience to the laws of those communities to which each of us is attached by birth, or to which we may be attached by a subsequent and lawful engagement.

From such plain, unrefined, and therefore I suppose true reasoning, the *just authority* of kings, and the *due obedience* of subjects, may be deduced with the utmost certainty. And surely it is far better for kings themselves to have their authority thus founded on principles incontestible, and on fair deductions from them, than on the chimeras of madmen, or, what has been more common, the sophisms of knaves. A *human right*, that cannot be controverted, is preferable surely to a *pretended divine right*, which every man must believe implicitly, as few will do, or not believe at all.

But the principles we have laid down do not stop here. A divine right in kings is to be deduced evidently from them. A divine right to govern *well*, and conformably to the constitution at the head of which they are placed. A divine right to govern *ill*, is an absurdity:

to assert it is blasphemy. A people may choose, or hereditary succession may raise, a *bad* prince to the throne; but a *good* king alone can derive his right to govern from *God*. The reason is plain: good government alone can be in the divine intention. God has made us to desire happiness; he has made our happiness dependent on society; and the happiness of society dependent on good or bad government. His intention therefore was, that government should be *good*.

This is essential to his wisdom; for wisdom consists surely in proportioning means to ends: therefore it cannot be said without absurd impiety, that he confers a right to oppose his intention.

The office of kings is then of *right divine*, and their persons are to be reputed *sacred*. As *men*, they have no such right, no such sacredness belonging to them: as *kings* they have both, unless they forfeit them. Reverence for government obliges to reverence governors, who, for the sake of it, are raised above the level of other men: but reverence for governors, independently of government, any further than reverence would
be

be due to their virtues if they were private men, is preposterous, and repugnant to common sense. The spring from which this legal reverence, for so I may call it, arises, is *national*, not *personal*. As well might we say that a ship is built, and loaded, and manned, for the sake of any particular pilot, instead of acknowledging that the pilot is made for the sake of the ship, her lading, and her crew, who are always the *owners* in the political vessel, as to say that kingdoms were instituted for kings, not kings for kingdoms. In short, and to carry our allusion higher, majesty is not an inherent, but a reflected light.

All this is as true of *elective*, as it is of *hereditary* monarchs; tho' the scriblers for tyranny, under the name of monarchy, would have us believe that there is something more august, and more sacred in one than the other. They are sacred *alike*, and this attribute is to be ascribed, or not ascribed to them, as they answer, or do not answer, the *Ends* of their institution. But there is another comparison to be made, in which a great and most important dissimilitude will be found between hereditary and elective

D 3

monarchy.

monarchy. Nothing can be more absurd, in pure *speculation*, than an hereditary right in any mortal to govern other men: and yet, in *practice*, nothing can be more absurd than to have a king to choose at every vacancy of a throne. We draw at a *lottery* indeed in one case, where there are many chances to lose, and few to gain. But have we much more advantage of this kind in the other? I think not. Upon these, and upon most occasions, the multitude would do at least as well to trust to chance as choice, and to their fortune as to their judgment. But in another respect the advantage is entirely on the side of hereditary succession: for in elective monarchies, these elections, whether well or ill made, are often attended with such *national calamities*, that even the best reigns cannot make amends for them; whereas in hereditary monarchy, whether a good or a bad prince succeeds, these calamities are avoided. There is one source of evil the less open: and one source of evil the less in human affairs, where there are so many, is sufficient to decide. We may lament the imperfections of our human state, which is such, that in cases of the utmost importance to the order and good government of society,

ciety, and by consequence to the happiness of our kind, we are reduced, by the very constitution of our nature, to have *no part* to take that our reason can *approve absolutely*. But tho' we lament it, we must submit to it. We must tell our selves once for all, that *perfect* schemes are not adapted to our imperfect state; that *Stoical morals* and *Platonic politics* are nothing better than amusements for those who have had little experience in the affairs of the world, and who have much leisure, *verbo otiosorum senum ad imperitos juvenes*; which was the censure, and a just one too, that DIONYSIUS past on some of the doctrines of the father of the academy. In truth, all that human prudence can do, is to furnish expedients, and to compound as it were with general vice and folly; employing reason to act even against her own principles, and teaching us, if I may say so, *insanire cum ratione*, which appears on many occasions not to be the paradox it has been thought.

To conclude this head therefore, as I think a *limited monarchy* the best of governments, so I think an *hereditary monarchy* the best of monarchies. I said a

limited monarchy; for an *unlimited monarchy*, wherein arbitrary will, which is in truth no rule, is however the sole rule, or stands instead of all rule of government, is so great an absurdity, both in reason informed or uninformed by experience, that it seems a government fitter for savages than for civilized people.

But I think it proper to explain a little more what I mean, when I say a *limited monarchy*, that I may leave nothing untouched which ought to be taken into consideration by us, when we attempt to fix our ideas of a PATRIOT KING.

Among many reasons which determine me to prefer *monarchy* to every form of government, this is a principal one. When monarchy is the essential form, it may be more easily and more usefully *tempered* with *aristocracy* or *democracy*, or both, than either of them, when they are the essential forms, can be *tempered* with *monarchy*. It seems to me, that the introduction of a real permanent monarchical power, or any thing more than the pageantry of it, into either of these, must destroy them and extinguish them, as a great

great light extinguishes a less. Where-
as it may easily be shewn, and the true
form of our government will demonstrate,
without seeking any other example, that
very considerable *aristocratical* and *demo-
cratical powers* may be grafted on a *mon-
archical stock*, without diminishing the
lustre, or restraining the power and au-
thority of the prince, enough to alter in
any degree the essential form.

A great difference is made in nature,
and therefore the distinction should be
always preserved in our notions, between
two things that we are apt to confound in
speculation, as they have been confounded
in practice, *legislative* and *monarchical
power*. There must be an absolute, unlim-
ited, and uncontrollable power lodged
somewhere in every government; but to
constitute monarchy, or the government
of a single person, it is not necessary that
this power should be lodged in the mon-
arch *alone*. It is no more necessary that
he should exclusively and independently
establish the rule of his government, than
it is, that he should govern without any
rule at all: and this surely will be thought
reasonable by no man.

I would not say God governs by a rule that we know, or may know as well as he, and upon our knowledge of which he appeals to men for the justice of his proceedings towards them; which a famous divine has impiously advanced, in a pretended demonstration of his being and attributes. God forbid! But this I may say, that God does always that which is fittest to be done, and that this fitness, whereof neither that presumptuous dogmatist was, nor any created being is, a competent judge, results from the various *natures*, and more various *relations* of things; so that, as creator of all systems by which these natures and relations are constituted, he prescribed to himself the *rule*, which he follows as governor of every system of being. In short, with reverence be it spoken, God is a monarch, yet not an arbitrary, but a limited monarch, limited by the *rule* which *infinite wisdom* prescribes to *infinite power*. I know well enough the impropriety of these expressions; but when our ideas are inadequate, our expressions must needs be improper. Such conceptions however as we are able to form of these attributes, and of the exercise of them in the government of the universe, may serve to
shew

shew what I have produced them to shew. If governing without *any rule*, and by *arbitrary will*, be not essential to our idea of the monarchy of the *Supreme Being*, it is plainly ridiculous to suppose them necessarily included in the idea of a *human monarchy*: and tho' God in his eternal ideas, for we are able to conceive no other manner of knowing, has prescribed to himself, that rule by which he governs the universe he *created*; it will be just as ridiculous to affirm, that the idea of human monarchy cannot be preserved, if kings are obliged to govern according to a rule established by the wisdom of a state, that was a state before they were kings, and by the consent of a people that they did not most certainly *create*; especially when the whole executive power is exclusively in their hands, and the legislative power cannot be exercised without their concurrence.

There are *limitations* indeed that would destroy the *essential form* of monarchy: or, in other words, a monarchical constitution may be changed, under pretence of limiting the monarch. This happened among us in the last century, when the vilest usurpation, and the most infamous tyranny was established over our nation,

by some of the worst and some of the meanest Men in it, I will not say, that the *essential form* of monarchy should be preserved, tho' the preservation of it were to cause the loss of *liberty*. *Salus reip. suprema lex esto*, is a fundamental law: and sure I am the *safety* of a commonwealth is ill provided for, if the *liberty* be given up. But this I presume to say, and can demonstrate, that *all* the limitations necessary to preserve liberty, as long as the *spirit* of it subsists, and longer than that, no limitation of monarchy, nor any other form of government, can preserve it, are *compatible* with monarchy. I think on these subjects, neither as the *Tories*, nor as the *Whigs* have thought: at least I endeavour to avoid the excesses of both. I neither *dress up* kings like so many *burlesque Jupiters*, weighing the fortunes of mankind in the scales of fate, and darting thunderbolts at the heads of rebellious giants: nor do I strip them *naked*, as it were, and leave them at most a few *tatter'd rags* to clothe their *majesty*, but such as can serve really as little for use as for ornament. My aim is to fix this principle, that *limitations* on a crown ought to be carried *as far* as it is necessary to secure the liberties of a people; and that

all

all such *limitations* may subsist, without weakening or endangering monarchy.

I shall be told perhaps, for I have heard it is said by many, that this point is imaginary, and that the limitations sufficient to procure good government, and to secure liberty under a *bad* prince, cannot be made, unless they are such as will deprive the subjects of many benefits in the reign of a *good* prince, *clog* his administration, maintain an unjust jealousy between him and his people, and occasion a defect of power necessary to preserve the public tranquillity, and to promote the national prosperity. If this was true, here would be a much more melancholy instance of the imperfections of our nature, and of the inefficacy of our reason to supply this imperfection, than the former. In the former, reason prompted by experience avoids a certain evil effectually, and is able to provide, in some measure, against the contingent evils that may arise from the expedient itself. But in the latter, if what is there advanced was true, these provisions against contingent evils would, in some cases, be the occasions of much certain evil, and of positive good in none: under a good prince they
would

would render the administration defective; and under a bad one there would be no government at all. But the truth is widely different from this representation. The limitations necessary to preserve liberty under monarchy will *restrain* effectually a *bad* prince, without being ever *felt* as *shackles* by a good one. Our constitution is brought, or almost brought, to such a point, a point of perfection I think it, that no *king* who is not, in the true meaning of the word, a *patriot*, can govern *Britain* with *ease*, *security*, *honour*, *dignity*, or indeed with *sufficient power* and *strength*. But yet a king, who is a patriot, may govern with all the former; and besides them, with power as extended as the most absolute monarch can boast, and a power too far more agreeable in the enjoyment, as well as more effectual in the operation.

To attain these great and noble ends, the patriotism must be real, and not in *show* alone. It is something to desire to appear a patriot: and the desire of having fame is a step towards having it, because it is a motive the more to deserve it. If it be true as TACITUS says, *Contemptu*

temptu fama contemni virtutem, that a contempt of a good name, or an indifference about it, begets or accompanies always a contempt of virtue, the contrary will be true; and they are certainly both true. But this motive alone is not sufficient. To constitute a *patriot*, whether *king* or *subject*, there must be something more substantial than a desire of *fame*, in the composition: and if there be not, this desire of fame will never rise above that sentiment which may be compared to the coquetry of women; a fondness of transient applause, which is courted by *vanity*, given by *flattery*, and spends itself in *shew*, like the qualities which acquire it. *Patriotism* must be founded in *great principles*, and supported by *great virtues*. The chief of these principles I have endeavoured to trace; and I will not scruple to assert, that a man can be a *good king* upon *no other*. He may, without them and by complexion, be unambitious, generous, good-natured; but without them the exercise even of these virtues will be often ill *directed*: and with principles of another sort, he will be drawn easily, notwithstanding these virtues, from all the purposes of his institution.

I mention

I mention those opposite principles the rather, because, instead of wondering that so many kings, unfit and unworthy to be trusted with the government of mankind, appear in the world, I have been tempted to wonder that there are any tolerable: when I have considered the flattery that environs them most commonly from the cradle, and the tendency of all those false notions that are instilled into them by precept, and by example, by the habits of courts, and by the interested selfish views of courtiers. They are bred to esteem themselves of a *distinct and superior species* among men, as men are among *animals*.

LEWIS the fourteenth was a strong instance of the effect of this *education*, which trains up kings to be tyrants, without knowing that they are so. That oppression under which he kept his people, during the whole course of a long reign, might proceed in some degree, from the natural haughtiness of his temper; but it proceeded in a greater degree from the principles and habits of his education. By this he had been brought to look on his kingdom as a patrimony that descended to him from his ancestors, and that was

to be considered in no other light: so that when a very considerable man had discoursed to him at large of the miserable condition to which his people was reduced, and had frequently used this word, *l'etat*; tho' the king approved the substance of all he had said, yet he was shocked at the frequent repetition of this word, and complained of it as of a kind of indecency to himself. This will not appear so strange to our second, as it may very justly to our first reflections; for what wonder is it, that princes are easily betrayed into an error that takes its rise in the general imperfection of our nature, in our pride, our vanity, and our presumption? the bastard children, but the children still, of self-love; a spurious brood, but often a favourite brood, that governs the whole family. As men are apt to make themselves the measure of all being, so they make themselves the final cause of all creation. Thus the reputed orthodox philosophers in all ages have taught that the world was made for man, the earth for him to inhabit, and all the luminous bodies in the immense expanse around us, for him to gaze at. Kings do no more, no not so much, when they imagine themselves the final cause
for

for which societies were formed, and governments instituted.

This capital error, in which almost every prince is confirmed by his *education*, has so great extent and so general influence, that a right to do every iniquitous thing in government may be derived from it. But as if this was not enough, the characters of princes are spoiled many more ways by their *education*. I shall not descend into a detail of such particulars, nor presume so much as to hint what regulations might be made about the *education of princes*, nor what part our *parliaments* might take occasionally in this momentous affair, lest I should appear too refining or too presumptuous in my speculations. But I may assert in general, that the indifference of mankind upon this head, especially in a government constituted like ours, is monstrous.

I may also take notice of another cause of the mistakes of princes, I mean the general conduct of those who are brought near to their persons. Such men, let me say, have a particular duty arising from this very situation; a duty common to them all, because it arises not from their
stations

stations which are different, but from their situation, which is the same. To enumerate the various applications of this duty would be too minute and tedious: but this may suffice, that all such men should bear constantly in mind, that the master they serve is to be the *king of their country*; that their attachment to him, therefore, is not to be like that of other servants to other *masters*, for *his* sake alone, or for *his* sake and *their own*, but for the sake of *their country* likewise.

CRATERUS *loves the king*, but HEPHESTION *loves ALEXANDER*, was a saying of the latter that has been often quoted, but not censured as it ought to be. ALEXANDER gave the preference to the attachment of HEPHESTION; but this preference was due undoubtedly to that of CRATERUS. Attachment to a private person must comprehend a great concern for his character and his interests: but attachment to one who is, or may be a king, much more; because the character of the latter is more important to himself and others; and because his interests are vastly more complicated with those of his Country, and in some sort with those of mankind. ALEXANDER him-
self

self seemed, upon one occasion, to make the distinction that should be always made between our attachments to a prince, and to any private Person. It was then PARMENIO advised him to accept the terms of peace which DARIUS offered: they were great, he thought them so; but he thought, no matter for my purpose whether justly or not, that it would be unbecoming him to accept them; therefore he rejected them, but acknowledged, that "he would have done as he was advised to do, if he had been PARMENIO."

As to persons who are not about a prince in the situation here spoken of, they can do little more than proportion their applause, and the Demonstrations of their confidence and affection, to the benefits they actually receive from the prince on the Throne, or to the just expectations that a successor gives them. It is of the latter I propose to speak here particularly. If he gives them those of a *good reign*, we may assure ourselves that they will carry, and in this case they ought to carry, that applause, and those demonstrations of their confidence and affection, as high as such a prince himself can desire. Thus the prince and the people take, in effect a sort of engagement with one another;

ther; the prince to govern well, and the people to honour and obey him. If he gives them expectations of *a bad reign*, they have this obligation to him at least, that he puts them early on their guard. And an obligation, and an advantage it will be, if they prepare for his accession as for a great and inevitable evil; and if they guard on every occasion against the ill use they foresee that he will make of money and power. Above all, they should not suffer themselves to be caught in the common snare, which is laid under specious pretences of "*gaining* such a prince, "*and of keeping him by public compli-*"
 "ances out of *bad hands.*" That argument has been pressed more than once, has prevailed, and has been fruitful of most pernicious consequences. None indeed can be more absurd: it is not unlike the reasoning of those savages who worship the devil, not because they love him or honour him, or expect any good from him, but that he may do them no hurt. Nay, it is more absurd; for the savages suppose, that the devil has *independently of them* the power to hurt them: whereas the others put more power into the hands of a prince, because he has already some power to hurt them; and trust to the justice and gratitude

tude of one who wants sense, virtue, or both, rather than increase and fortify the barriers against his folly and his vices.

But the truth is, that men who reason and act in this manner either mean, or else are led by such as mean, nothing more than to make a *private court* at the *public expence*; who chuse to be the instruments of a bad king rather than to be out of power; and who are often so wicked, that they would *prefer* such a service to that of the best of kings. In fine, these reasons, and every other reason for providing against a *bad reign* in prospect, acquire a new force when one weak or wicked prince is, in the order of succession, to follow another of the same character. Such provisions indeed are *hardest* to be obtained when they are the *most necessary*; that is, when the spirit of liberty begins to flag in a free people, and when they become disposed by habits that have grown insensibly upon them, to a base submission. But they are *necessary too*, even when they are *easiest* to be obtained; that is, when the spirit of liberty is in full strength, and a disposition to oppose all instances of male-administration, and to resist all attempts on liberty, is universal. In both cases, the endeavours of every man who loves
his

his country will be employed with incessant care and constancy to obtain them; that good government and liberty may be the better preserved and secured: but in the latter case, for this further reason also, that the preservation and security of these may be provided for, not only better, but *more consistently* with *public tranquillity*, by *constitutional* methods, and a *legal* course of opposition to the excesses of regal or ministerial power. What I touch upon here might be made extremely plain; and I think the observation would appear to be of no small importance: but I should be carried too far from my subject, and my subject will afford me matter of more agreeable speculation.

It is true, that a prince who gives just reasons to expect that his reign will be that of a PATRIOT KING, may not always meet, and from all persons, such returns as such expectations deserve: but they must not hinder either the prince from continuing to give them, or the people from continuing to acknowledge them. United, none can hurt them: and if no artifice interrupts, no power can defeat the effects of their perseverance. It will blast many a wicked project,

ject, keep virtue in countenance, and vice to some degree at least in awe. Nay, if it should fail to have these effects, if we should even suppose a good prince to suffer with the people, and in some measure for them, yet many advantages would accrue to him: for instance, the cause of the people he is to govern, and his own cause would be made the same by their common enemies. He would feel grievances himself as a subject, before he had the power of imposing them as a king. He would be formed in that school out of which the greatest and the best of monarchs have come, the school of affliction: and all the vices, which had prevailed before his reign, would serve as so many foils to the glories of it. But I hasten to speak of the greatest of all these advantages, and of that which a PATRIOT KING will esteem to be such; whose ways of thinking and acting to so glorious a purpose as the re-establishment of a free constitution, when it has been shook by the iniquity of former administrations, I shall endeavour to explain.

What I have here said will pass among some for the reveries of a distempered brain, at best for the vain speculations of an idle man who has lost sight of the world,

world, or who had never sagacity enough to discern in government the practicable from the impracticable. Will it not be said, that this is advising a king to rouse a spirit which may turn against himself; to reject the sole expedient of governing a limited monarchy with success, to labour to confine, instead of labouring to extend his power; to patch up an old constitution, which his people are disposed to lay aside, instead of forming a new one more agreeable to them, and more advantageous to him; to refuse in short, to be an *absolute monarch*, when every circumstance invites him to it? All these particulars, in every one of which the question is begged, will be thus represented, and will be then ridiculed as paradoxes fit to be ranked among the *mirabilia & inopinata* of the stoics, and such as no man in his senses can maintain in earnest. These judgments and these reasonings may be expected in an age as futile and as corrupt as ours: in an age wherein so many betray the cause of liberty, and act not only without regard, but in direct opposition to the most important interests of their country; not only occasionally, by surprize, by weakness, by strong temptation, or sly seduction, but constantly, steadily, by deliberate choice,

E

and

and in pursuance of principles they avow and propagate : in an age when so many others shrink from the service of their country or promote it coolly or uncertainly, in subordination to their own interest and humour, or to those of a party : in an age, when to assert the truth is called spreading of delusion, and to assert the cause of liberty and good government, is termed sowing of sedition. But I have declared already my unconcernedness at the censure or ridicule of such men as these ; for whose *supposed abilities* I have much well-grounded contempt, and against whose *real immorality* I have as just indignation.

Let us come therefore to the bar of reason and experience, where we shall find those paradoxes admitted as plain and almost self-evident propositions, and those reveries and plain speculations as important truths, confirmed by experience in all ages and all countries.

MACHIAVEL is an author who should have great authority with the persons likely to oppose me. He proposes to princes the amplification of their power, the extent of their dominion, and the subjection of their people, as the sole objects of their policy.

policy. He devises and recommends all means that tend to these purposes, without the consideration of any duty owing to god or man, or any regard to the morality or immorality of actions. Yet even he declares the affectation of virtue to be useful to princes: he is so far on my side in the present question. The only difference between us is, I would have the virtue real: he requires no more than the appearance of it.

In the tenth chapter of the first book of *Discourses*, he appears convinced, such is the force of truth, but how consistently with himself let others determine, that the supreme glory of a prince accrues to him who establishes good government and a *free constitution*; and that a prince, ambitious of fame, must wish to come into possession of a disordered and corrupted state, not to finish the wicked work that others have begun, and to compleat the ruin, but to stop the progress of the first, and to prevent the last. He thinks this not only the true way to *fame*, but to *security* and *quiet*; as the contrary leads, for here is no third way, and a prince must make his option between these two, not only to infamy, but to danger and to perpetual disquietude. He represents those who might establish a com-

monwealth or a legal monarchy, and who chuse to improve the opportunity of establishing tyranny, that is, monarchy without any rule of law, as men who are deceived by false notions of good, and false appearances of glory, and who are in effect blind to their true interest in every respect : *Ne si auvergono pro questo partito quanta fama, quanta gloria, quanto honore, sicurezza, quiete, con satisfatione d'animo e' fuggono, & in quanta infamia, vituperio, biasimo, pericolo & inquietudine incorrono.* He touches another advantage which patriot princes reap : and in that he contradicts flatly the main point on which his half-taught scholars insist. He denies, that such princes *diminish* their power by *circumscribing* it ; and affirms, with truth on his side, that TIMOLEON, and others of the same character whom he had cited, possessed as great authority in their country, with every other advantage besides, as DIONYSIUS or PHALARIS had acquired, with the loss of all those advantages. Thus far MACHIAVEL reasons justly ; but he takes in only a *part* of his subject, and confines himself to those motives that should determine a wise prince to maintain liberty, because it is his *interest* to do so. He rises no higher than the consideration of mere interest, of fame, of security,

security, of quiet, and of power, all personal to the prince: and by such motives alone even his favourite BORGIA might have been determined to affect the virtues of a patriot prince: more than which this great doctor in political knowledge would not have required of him. But he is far from going up to that motive which should above all determine a good prince to hold this conduct, because it is his *duty to do so*; a duty that he owes to God by one law, and to his people by another. Now it is with this that I shall begin what I intend to offer concerning the system of principles and conduct by which a patriot king will govern himself and his people. I shall not only begin higher, but descend into more detail, and keep still in my eye the application of the whole to the constitution of *Great Britain*, even to the present state of our nation, and temper of our people.

I think enough has been already said, to establish the *first and true principles of monarchical* and indeed of *every other kind of government*: and I will say with confidence, that no principles but these, and such as these can be advanced, which deserve to be treated seriously, tho' Mr. LOCK condescended to examine those of FILMER,

more out of regard to the prejudices of the time, than to the importance of the work. Upon such foundations we must conclude, that since men were directed by nature to form *societies*, because they cannot by their nature subsist without them, nor in a state of *individuality*; and since they were directed in like manner to establish *governments*, because societies cannot be maintained without them, nor subsist in a state of *anarchy*; the ultimate end of all governments, is the *good* of the *people*, for *whose sake* they were made, and *without whose consent* they could not have been made. In forming societies, and submitting to government, men give up part of that *liberty* to which they are all born, and all alike. But why? Is government incompatible with a full enjoyment of *liberty*? By no means. But because popular liberty without government will degenerate into *licence*, as government without sufficient liberty will degenerate into *tyranny*, they are mutually necessary to each other, good government to support legal liberty, and legal liberty to preserve good government.

I speak here not of people, if any such there are, who have been savage or stupid enough to submit to tyranny by original

ginal contract; nor of those nations on whom tyranny has stolen as it were imperceptibly, or been imposed by violence, and settled by prescription. I shall exercise no political casuistry about the rights of *such kings*, and the obligation of *such people*. Men are to take their lots, perhaps, in governments as in climates, to fence against the inconveniencies of both, and to bear what they cannot alter. But I speak of people who have been wise and happy enough to establish, and to preserve *free constitutions* of government, as the people of *this island* have done. To these therefore I say, that their kings are under the most sacred obligations that *human law* can create, and *divine law* authorize, to defend and maintain, in the first place, and preferably to every other consideration, the *freedom* of such constitutions.

The *good of the people* is the ultimate and true *end* of government. Governours are therefore appointed for *this end*, and the civil constitution which appoints them, and invests them with their power, is determined to do so by that *law of nature* and *reason*, which has determined the *end* of government, and which admits this *form* of government as the proper

mean of arriving at it. Now the greatest good of a people is their liberty : and in the case here referred to, the people has judged it so, and provided for it accordingly. *Liberty* is to the collective body, what *health* is to every individual body. Without *health* no pleasure can be tasted by man : without *liberty* no happiness can be enjoyed by *society*. The obligation, therefore, to defend and maintain the freedom of such constitutions, will appear most sacred to a patriot king.

Kings who have weak understandings, bad hearts, and strong prejudices, and all these, as it often happens, inflamed by their passions, and rendered incurable by their self-conceit and presumption ; such kings are apt to imagine, and they conduct themselves so as to make many of their subjects imagine, that the king and the people in free governments are *rival powers*, who stand in *competition* with one another, who have *different interests*, and must of course have different *views* : that the *rights* and *privileges* of the people are so many *spoils* taken from the *right* and *prerogative* of the crown ; and that the rules and laws, made for the exercise and security of the former, are so many
diminutions

diminutions of their dignity, and *restraints* on their power.

A patriot king will see all this in a far different and much truer light. The constitution will be considered by him as *one law*, consisting of *two tables*, containing the rule of his government, and the measure of his subjects obedience; or as *one system*, composed of *different parts* and *powers*, but all duly proportioned to one another, and conspiring by their harmony to the perfection of the whole. He will make one, and *but one* distinction between his rights, and those of his people: he will look on his to be a *trust*, and theirs a *property*. He will discern, that ~~he~~ *he* can have a right to no more than is trusted to him by the constitution: and that his people, who had an original right to the *whole* by the law of nature, can have the sole indefeazable right to *any part*; and really have such a right to *that part* which they have reserved to themselves. In fine, the *constitution* will be revered by him as the *law of God* and of *man*; the *force* of which binds the king *as much* as the meanest subject, and the *reason* of which binds him *much more*.

Thus he will think, and on these principles he will act, whether he come to the throne by immediate or remote election. I say *remote*; for in hereditary monarchies, where *men* are not elected, *families* are: and therefore some authors would have it believed, that when a family has been once admitted, and an hereditary right to the crown recognized in it, that right cannot be forfeited, nor that throne become vacant, as long as any heir of the family remains. How much more agreeably to truth and to common sense would these authors have written, if they had maintained, that every prince who comes to a crown in the course of succession, were he the *last* of five hundred, comes to it under the *same* conditions under which the *first* took it, whether expressed or implied; as well as under those if any such there be, which have been since made by legal authority: and that royal blood can give no right, nor length of succession any prescription, against the constitution of a government? The *first* and the *last* hold by the *same* tenure.

I mention this the rather, because I have an imperfect remembrance, that some scribler was employed, or employed himself,

himself, to assert the *hereditary right* of the present royal family. A task so unnecessary to any good purpose, that I believe a suspicion arose of its having been designed for a bad one. A patriot king will never countenance such impertinent fallacies, nor deign to lean on broken reeds. He knows that his right is founded on the *laws of God and man*, that none can shake it but himself, and that his own virtue is sufficient to maintain it against all opposition.

I have dwelt the longer on the *first* and *general principles* of *monarchical government*, and have recurred the oftener to them; because it seems to me that they are the *seeds of patriotism*, which must be sowed as soon as possible in the mind of a prince, lest their growth should be checked by rank luxuriant weeds, which are apt to abound in such soils, and under which no crop of kingly virtues can ever flourish. A prince, who does not know the *true principles*, cannot propose to himself the *true ends of government*: and he, who does not propose them, will never direct his conduct steadily to them. There is not a deeper, nor a finer observation in all my Lord BACON's works, than one

E 6

which.

which I shall apply and paraphrase on this occasion. The most compendious, the most noble, and the most effectual remedy which can be opposed to the uncertain and irregular motions of the human mind, agitated by various passions, allured by various temptations, inclining sometimes towards a state of moral perfections, and oftener even in the best towards a state of moral depravation, is this. We must chuse betimes such *virtuous objects* as are proportioned to the means we have of pursuing them, and as belong particularly to the *stations* we are in, and to the duties of those stations. We must *determine* and *fix* our minds in such manner upon them, that the pursuit of them may become the *business*, and the attainment of them the *end* of our whole lives. Thus we shall imitate the great operations of nature, and not the feeble, slow, and imperfect operations of art. We must not proceed, in forming the moral character, as a statuary proceeds in forming a statue, who works sometimes on the face, sometimes on one part, and sometimes on another: but we must proceed, and it is in our power to proceed, as nature does in forming a flower, an animal, or any other of her productions; *rudimenta*

menta partium omnium simul parit & producit. “ She throws out altogether, and “ at once, the whole system of every being, and the rudiments of all the parts.” The vegetable or the animal grows in bulk, and increases in strength ; but is the *same from the first*. Just so our patriot king must be a patriot from the first. He must be such in resolution, before he grows such in practice. He must fix at once the *general principles and ends* of all his actions, and determine that his whole conduct shall be regulated by them, and directed to them. When he has done this, he will have turned, by one great effort, the bent of his mind so strongly towards the perfection of a kingly character, that he will exercise with ease, and as it were by a natural determination, all the virtues of it ; which will be suggested to him on every occasion by the *principles* wherewith his mind is imbued, and by those *ends* that are the constant objects of his attention.

Let us then see in what manner, and with what effect he will do this, upon the greatest occasion he can have of exercising these virtues, the *maintainance of liberty*, and the *re-establishment of a free constitution*. The

The freedom of a constitution rests on *two* points. The orders of it are one: so MACHIAVEL calls them, and I know not how to call them more significantly. He means not only the forms and customs, but the different classes and assemblies of men, with different powers and privileges attributed to them, which are established in the state. The *spirit* and *character* of the *people* are the other. On the mutual conformity and harmony of these the preservation of liberty depends. To take away, or essentially to alter the former, cannot be brought to pass, whilst the latter remains in original purity and vigour: nor can liberty be destroyed by this method, unless the attempt be made with a military force sufficient to conquer the nation, which would not submit in this case till it was conquered, nor with much security to the conqueror even then. But these *orders* of the state may be essentially altered, and serve more effectually to the destruction of liberty than the taking of them away would serve, if the *spirit* and *character* of the people are lost.

Now this method of destroying liberty is the most dangerous on many

ny accounts, particularly on this; that even the reign of the weakest prince, and the policy of the weakest ministry, may effect the destruction, when circumstances are favourable to this method. If a people is growing corrupt, there is no need of capacity to contrive, nor of insinuation to gain, nor of plausibility to seduce, nor of eloquence to persuade, nor of authority to impose, nor of courage to attempt. The most incapable, awkward, ungracious, shocking, profligate, and timorous wretches, invested with power, and masters of the purse, will be sufficient for the work, when the people are complices in it. Luxury is rapacious; let them feed it: the more it is fed, the more profuse it will grow. What is the consequence of profusion, venality of want, and dependance of venality. By this progeffion, the first men of a nation will become the pensioners of the least; and he who has talents, the most implicit tool to him who has none. The distemper will soon descend, not indeed to make a depofite *below*, and to remain there, but to pervade the *whole body*.

It may seem a singular, but it is perhaps a true proposition, that such a king
and

and such a ministry are more likely to *begin* to *pursue* with success, this method of destroying a free constitution of government, than a king and a ministry that were held in great esteem would be. This very *esteem* might put many on their guard against the latter; but the former may draw from *contempt* the advantage of *not being feared*: and an advantage this is in the beginning of corruption. Men are willing to excuse, not only to others, but to themselves, the first steps they take in vice, and especially in vice that affects the public, and whereof the public has a right to complain. Those therefore who might withstand corruption in one case, from a persuasion that the consequence was too certain to leave them any excuse, may yield to it when they can flatter themselves, and endeavour to flatter others, that liberty cannot be destroyed, nor the constitution be demolished by *such hands* as hold the scepter, and guide the reins of the administration. But alas! the flattery is gross, and the excuse without colour. These men may ruin their country, but they cannot impose on any, unless it be on themselves. Nor will even this imposition on themselves be long necessary. Their consciences will be soon-seared, by
bahit

habit and by *example*: and they, who wanted an *excuse* to *begin*, will want *none* to *continue* and to *complete* the tragedy of their country. Old men will outlive the shame of losing liberty, and young men will arise who know not that it ever existed. A spirit of slavery will oppose and oppress the spirit of liberty, and seem at least to be the genius of the nation. Such too it will become in time, when corruption has once grown to this height, unless the progress of it can be interrupted.

How inestimable a blessing therefore must the succession of a patriot king be esteemed in such circumstances as these, which would be a blessing, and a great one too, in another? He, and he alone, can save a country whose ruin is so far advanced. The utmost that private men can do, who remain untainted by the general contagion, is to keep the spirit of liberty alive in a few breasts; to protest against what they cannot hinder, and to claim on every occasion what they cannot by their own strength recover.

MACHIAVEL has treated, in the discourses before cited, this question, ‘*whether, when the people are grown corrupt, a free government can be maintained,*

‘tained, if they enjoy it; or established, ‘if they enjoy it not?’ And upon the whole matter he concludes for the difficulty or rather the impossibility, of succeeding in either case. It will be worth while to observe his way of reasoning. He asserts very truly, and proves by the example of the *Roman* commonwealth, that those *orders* which are proper to maintain liberty, whilst a people remain uncorrupt, become improper and hurtful to liberty when a people is grown corrupt. To remedy this abuse, new laws alone will not be sufficient. These *orders* therefore must be *changed*, according to him, and the constitution must be adapted to the depraved manners of the people. He shews that such a change in the orders, and constituent parts of the government, is impracticable, whether the attempt be made by gentle and slow, or by violent and precipitate measures: and from thence he concludes, that a *free commonwealth* can neither be *maintained* by a *corrupt people*, nor be *established* among them. But he adds, that ‘if this can possibly be done, ‘it must be done by drawing the constitution to the *monarchical form* of government,’ *acchioce quelli huomini i quali dalle leggi non possono essere corretti, fussero*

fussero da una podestà, in qualche modo, frenati. ‘ That a *corrupt people*, whom law ‘ cannot correct, may be restrained and ‘ corrected by a *kingly power*.’ Here is the hinge on which the whole turns.

Another advantage that a *free monarchy* has over all other forms of free government, besides the advantage of being more easily and more usefully tempered with aristocratical and democratical powers, which is mentioned above, is this. Those governments are made up of *different parts*, and are apt to be disjointed by the shocks to which they are exposed : but a free monarchical government is more compact, because there is a *part the more* that *keeps*, like the *key-stone* of a vault, the whole building together. They cannot be *mended* in a state of corruption, they must be in effect *constituted anew*, and in that attempt they may be dissolved for ever : but this is not the case of a free monarchy. To preserve liberty by *new* laws and *new* schemes of government, whilst the corruption of a people *continues* and *grows*, is absolutely impossible every where : but to restore and to preserve it under *old* laws, and an *old* constitution, by reinfusing into the minds of
men

men the *spirit of this constitution*, is not only possible, but is in a particular manner, easy to a *king*. A corrupt commonwealth remains without remedy, tho' all the orders and forms of it subsist: a free monarchical government cannot remain absolutely so, as long as the orders and forms of the constitution subsist. These *alone* are indeed nothing more than the dead letter of freedom or masks of liberty. In the first character they serve to no good purpose whatsoever: in the second they serve to a bad one, because tyranny, or government by will, becomes more severe, and more secure, under their disguise, than it would if it was barefaced and avowed. But a king can, easily to himself, and without violence to his people, renew the spirit of liberty in their minds, quicken this dead letter, and pull off this mask.

As soon as corruption ceases to be an expedient of government, and it will cease to be such as soon as a patriot king is raised to the throne, the *panacea* is applied: the spirit of the constitution revives of course; and as fast as it revives, the orders and forms of the constitution are restored to their primitive integrity, and become what they were intended to be;

be; *real barriers* against arbitrary power, not *blinds* nor *masks* under which tyranny may lie concealed. Depravation of manners exposed the constitution to ruin; reformation will secure it. Men decline easily from virtue; for there is a devil too in the political system, a constant tempter at hand: a patriot king will want neither power nor inclination to cast out this devil, to make the temptation cease, and to deliver his subjects if not from the guilt, yet from the consequence, of their fall. Under him, they will not only cease to do evil, but learn to do well; for by rendering public virtue and real capacity the sole means of acquiring any degree of power or profit in the state, he will set the passions of their hearts on the side of liberty and good government. A patriot king is the most powerful of all reformers; for he is himself a sort of standing miracle, so rarely seen and so little understood, that the sure effects of his appearance will be admiration and love in every honest breast, confusion and terror to every guilty conscience, but submission and resignation in all. A new people will seem to rise with a new king. Innumerable metamorphoses, like those which poets feign, will happen in very deed:

deed: and while men are conscious that they are the same individuals, the difference of their sentiments will almost persuade them that they are changed into different beings.

But that we may not expect more from such a king than even he can perform, it is necessary to premise another general observation, after which I shall descend into some that will be more particular.

Absolute stability is not to be expected in any thing human; for that which exists immutably exists alone necessarily, and this attribute of the Supreme Being can neither belong to man, nor to the works of man. The best instituted governments, like the best constituted animal bodies, carry in them the seeds of their destruction: and tho' they grow and improve for a time, they will soon tend visibly to their dissolution. Every hour they live is an hour the less that they have to live. All that can be done therefore to prolong the duration of a good government, is to draw it back, on every favourable occasion, to the *first good principles* on which it was founded. When these occasions happen often, and are well improved, such

such governments are prosperous and durable. When they happen seldom, or are ill improved, these political bodies live in pain or in languor, and die soon.

A patriot king affords one of the occasions I mention in a free monarchical state, and the very best that can happen. It should be improved, like snatches of fair weather at sea, to repair the damages sustained in the last storm, and to prepare to resist the next. For such a king cannot secure to his people a succession of princes like himself. He will do all he can towards it, by his example and by his instruction. But after all, the royal mantle will not convey the spirit of patriotism into another king, as the mantle of *Elijah* did the gift of prophecy into another prophet. The utmost he can do, and that which deserves the utmost gratitude from his subjects, is to restore good government, to revive the spirit of it, and to maintain and confirm both, during the whole course of his reign. The rest his people must do for themselves. If they do not, they will have none but themselves to blame: if they do, they will have the principal obligation to him. In all events they will have been free-
men

men one reign the longer by his means, and perhaps more ; since he will leave them much better prepared and disposed to defend their liberties, than he found them.

This general observation being made, let us now descend, in some detail, to the particular *steps* and *measures* that such a king must pursue, to merit a much nobler title than all those which many princes of the west, as well as the east, are so proud to accumulate.

First then, he must begin to govern as soon as he begins to reign. For the very first step he makes in government will give the first impresson, and as it were the presage of his reign ; and may be of great importance in many other respect besides that of opinion and reputation. His first care will be, no doubt, to *purge his court*, and to call into the administration such men, as he can assure himself will *serve* on the *same principles* on which he intends to *govern*.

As to the first point ; if the precedent reign has been bad, we know how he will find the court composed. The men

in power will be some of those adventurers, busy and bold, who thrust and crowd themselves early into the intrigue of party and the management of affairs of state, often without true ability, always without true ambition, or even the appearances of virtue : who mean nothing more than what is called making a fortune, the acquisition of wealth to satisfy avarice, and of titles and ribbands to satisfy vanity. Such as these are sure to be employed by a weak, or a wicked king : they impose on the first, and are chosen by the last. Nor is it marvellous that they are so, since every other want is supplied in them by the want of good principles and a good conscience ; and since these defects become ministerial perfections, in a reign when measures are pursued and designs carried on that every honest man will disapprove. All the prostitutes who set themselves to sale, all the locusts who devour the land, with crowds of spies, parasites and sycophants, will surround the throne under the patronage of such ministers ; and whole swarms of little noisome, nameless insects will hum and buzz in every corner of the court. Such ministers will be cast off, and such abettors of a ministry will be chaf-

ed away together, and at once, by a patriot king.

Some of them perhaps will be abandoned by him ; not to party-fury, but to national justice ; not to sate private resentments, and to serve particular interests, but to make satisfaction for wrongs done to their country, and to stand as examples of terror to future administrations. Clemency makes, no doubt, an amiable part of the character I attempt to draw ; but clemency to be a virtue, must have its bounds like other virtues, and surely these bounds are extended enough by a maxim I have read somewhere, that frailties and even vices may be passed over, but not enormous crimes : *multa donanda ingeniis puto ; sed donanda vitia, non portenta.*

Among the bad company with which such a court will abound, may be reckoned a sort of men too low to be much regarded, and too high to be quite neglected ; the lumber of every administration, the furniture of every court. These gilt carved things are seldom answerable for more than the men on a chess-board, who, are moved about at will, and on whom the
conduct

conduct of the game is not to be charged. Some of these every prince must have about him. The pageantry of a court requires that he should, and this pageantry, like many other despicable things, ought not to be laid aside. But as much sameness as there may appear in the characters of this sort of men, there is one distinction that will be made, whenever a good prince succeeds to the throne after an iniquitous administration: the distinction I mean is, between those who have affected to dip themselves deeply in precedent iniquities, and those who have had the virtue to keep aloof from them, or the good luck not to be called to any share in them. And thus much for the first point, that of purging his court.

As to the second, that of calling to his administration such men as he can assure himself will *serve* on the *same principles* on which he intends to *govern*, there is no need to enlarge much upon it. A good prince will no more chuse ill men, than a wise prince will chuse Fools. Deception in one case is indeed more easy than in the other; because a knave may be an artful hypocrite, whereas a silly fellow can never impose himself for a

F 2

man

man of sense. And least of all, in a country like ours, can either of these deceptions happen, if any degree of the discernment of spirits be employed to chuse. The reason is, because every man here, who stands forward enough in rank and reputation to be called to the councils of his king, must have given proofs beforehand of his patriotism as well as of his capacity, if he has either, sufficient to determine his general character.

There is, however, one distinction to be made as to the capacity of ministers, on which I will insist a little : because I think it very important at all times, particularly so at this time ; and because it escapes observation most commonly. The distinction I mean is that between a cunning man and a wise man : and this distinction is built on a manifest difference in nature, how imperceptible soever it may become to weak eyes, or to eyes that look at their object thro' the false medium of custom and habit. My lord *Bacon* says, that cunning is *left-handed or crooked wisdom*. I would rather say that it is a part, but the lowest part of wisdom ; employed alone by some, because they have not the other parts to employ : and by some, because it is as much as they want,

want, within those bounds of action which they prescribe to themselves, and sufficient to the ends that they propose. The difference seems to consist in degree and application, rather than in kind, Wisdom is neither left-handed, nor crooked : but the heads of some men contain little, and the hearts of others employ it wrong. To use my lord *Bacon's* own comparison, the cunning man knows how to pack the cards, the wise man how to play the game better : but it would be of no use to the first to pack the cards, if his knowledge stopt here, and he had no skill in the game ; nor to the second to play the game better, if he did not know how to pack the cards, that he might unpack them by new shuffling. Inferior wisdom or cunning may get the better of folly ; but superior wisdom will get the better of cunning. Wisdom and cunning have often the same objects ; but a wise man will have more and greater in his view. The least will not fill his soul, nor ever become the principal there ; but will be pursued in subserviency, in subordination at least, to the other. Wisdom and cunning may employ sometimes the same means too : but the wise man stoops to those means, and the other cannot rise above them. Simulation

and dissimulation for instance are the chief arts of cunning: the first will be esteemed always by a wise man unworthy of him, and will be therefore avoided by him, in every possible case; for, to resume my lord *Bacon's* comparison, simulation is put on that we may look into the cards of another, whereas dissimulation intends nothing more than to hide our own. Simulation is a filetto, not only an offensive, but an unlawful weapon; and the use of it may be rarely, very rarely, excused, but never justified. Dissimulation is a shield, as secrecy is armour: and it is no more possible to preserve secrecy in the administration of publick affairs without some degree of dissimulation, than it is to succeed in it without secrecy. Those two arts of cunning are like the alloy mingled with pure ore. A little is necessary, and will not debase the coin below it's proper standard; but if more than that little be employed, the coin loses it's currency, and the coiner his credit.

We may observe much the same difference between wisdom and cunning, both as to the objects they propose, and to the means they employ, as we observe between the visual powers of different men. One sees distinctly the objects that are near to him,

him, their immediate relations, and their direct tendencies; and a sight like this serves well enough the purpose of those who concern themselves no further. The cunning minister is one of those: he neither sees nor is concerned to see any further, than his personal interests, and the support of his administration require. If such a man overcomes any actual difficulty, avoids an immediate distress, or, without doing either of these effectually, gains a little time, by all the low artifices which cunning is ready to suggest and baseness of mind to employ; he triumphs, and is flattered by his mercenary train on the great event, which amounts often to no more than this, that he got into distress by one series of faults, and out of it by another. The wise minister sees, and is concerned to see further, because government has a further concern: he sees the objects that are distant as well as those that are near, and all their remote relations, and even their indirect tendencies. He thinks of fame as well as of applause, and prefers that, which to be enjoyed must be given, to that which may be bought. He considers his administration as a single day in the great year of government; but as a day that is affected by those which went before, and that must affect those which are to follow. He combines

therefore and compares all these objects, relations, and tendencies, and the judgment he makes on an entire, not a partial survey of them, is the rule of his conduct. That scheme of the reason of state which lies open before a wise minister contains all the great principles of government, and all the great interests of his country: so that as he prepares some events, he prepares against others, whether they be likely to happen during his administration, or in some future time.

Many reflections might be added to these, and many examples be brought to illustrate them. Some I could draw from the men I have seen at the head of business, and make very strong contrasts of men of great wisdom with those of meer cunning. But I conclude this head, that I may proceed to another of no less importance.

To espouse no party, but to govern like the common father of his people, is so essential to the character of a patriot king, that he who does otherwise, forfeits the title. It is the peculiar privilege and glory of this character, that princes who maintain it, and they alone, are so far from

from the necessity, that they are not exposed to the temptation, of *governing by a party*: which must always end in the government of a *faction*; the faction of the *prince* if he has ability, the faction of his *ministers* if he has not, and either one way or other in the oppression of the people. For *faction* is to *party* what the *superlative* is to the *positive*: *party* is a political evil, and *faction* is the *worst* of all *parties*. The true image of a free people, governed by a patriot king, is that of a patriarchal family, where the head and all the members are united by one common interest, and animated by one common spirit; and where, if any are perverse enough to have another, they will be soon borne down by the superiority of those who have the same; and far from making a *division*, they will but confirm the union of the little state. That to approach as near as possible to these ideas of perfect government, and social happiness under it, is desirable in every state, no man will be absurd enough to deny. The sole question is therefore, how near to them it is possible to attain? For, if this attempt be not absolutely impracticable, all the views of a patriot king will be directed to make it succeed. In-

stead of abetting the divisions of his people he will endeavour to unite them, and to be himself the center of their union: instead of putting himself at the head of *one party* in order to govern *his people*, he will put himself at the head of *his people* in order to govern, or more properly to subdue *all parties*. Now, to arrive at this desirable union, and to maintain it, will be found more difficult in some cases than in others, but absolutely impossible in none, to a wise and good prince.

If his people are *united* in their submission to him, and in their attachment to the established government, he must not only *espouse* but *create* a party, in order to govern by *one*: and what should tempt him to pursue so wild a measure? A prince who aims at more power than the constitution gives him, may be so tempted; because he may hope to obtain in the disorders of the state what cannot be obtained in quiet times; and because contending parties will give what a nation will not. Parties, even before they degenerate into absolute factions, are still numbers of men associated together for certain purposes, and certain interests,
which

which are not, or which are not allowed to be those of the community by others. A more private or personal interest comes but too soon, and too often, to be super-added, and to grow predominant in them: and when it does so, whatever occasions or principles began to form them, the same logic prevails in them that prevails in every church. The interest of the state is supposed to be that of the party, as the interest of religion is supposed to be that of the church: and, with this pretence or prepossession, the interest of the state becomes like that of religion, a remote consideration, is never pursued for it's own sake, and is often sacrificed to the other. A king, therefore, who has ill designs to carry on, must endeavour to divide an united people; and, by blending or seeming to blend his interests with that of a party, he may succeed perhaps; and his party and he may share the spoils of a ruined nation: but such a party is then become a faction, such a king is a tyrant, and such a government is a conspiracy. A patriot king must renounce his character to have such designs, or act against his own designs to pursue such methods. Both are too absurd to be supposed. It remains therefore, that as all the good

ends of government are most attainable in an united state, and as the divisions of a people can serve to bad purposes alone, the king we suppose here will deem the union of his subjects his greatest advantage, and will think himself happy to find that established, which he would have employed the whole labour of his life to bring about. This seems so plain, that I am ready to make excuses for having insisted at all upon it.

Let us turn ourselves to another supposition, to that of a *divided state*. This will fall in oftener with the ordinary course of things in free governments, and especially after iniquitous and weak administrations. Such a state may be better or worse, and the great and good purposes of a patriot king more or less attainable in it, according to the different nature of those *divisions*, and therefore we will consider this state in different lights.

A people may be *united* in submission to the prince, and to the establishment, and yet be *divided* about *general principles*, or *particular measures* of government. In the first case, they will do by
their

their constitution what has been frequently done by the Scripture, strain it to their own notions and prejudices; and if they cannot strain it, alter it as much as is necessary to render it conformable to them. In the second, they will support or oppose particular acts of administrations, and defend, or attack the persons employed in them: and both these ways a conflict of parties may arise, but no great difficulty to a prince who determines to pursue the union of his subjects, and the prosperity of his kingdoms, independently of all parties.

When parties are divided by different notions and principles concerning some particular ecclesiastical or civil institutions, the constitution, which should be *their* rule, must be that of the prince. He may, and he ought to shew his dislike or his favour, as he judges the constitution may be hurt or improved, by one side or the other. The hurt he is never to suffer, not for his own sake; and therefore surely not for the sake of any whimsical, factious, or ambitious set of men. The improvement he must always desire, but as every new modification in a scheme of government and of national policy, is of great importance,

importance, and requires more and deeper consideration than the warmth and hurry and rashness of party-conduct admit, the duty of a prince seems to require that he should render by his influence the proceedings more *orderly* and more *deliberate*, even when he approves the end to which they are directed. All this may be done by him without fomenting division; and far from forming, or espousing a party, he will defeat party in defence of the constitution, on some occasions; and lead men from acting with a party-spirit, to act with a national spirit, on others.

When the division is about *particular measures* of government, and the conduct of the administration is alone concerned, a patriot king will stand in want of party as little as in any other case. Under his reign, the opportunities of forming an opposition of this sort will be rare, and the pretences generally weak. Nay the motives to it will lose much of their force, when a government is strong in reputation, and men are kept in good humour by feeling the rod of a party on no occasion, tho' they feel the weight of the scepter on some. Such opportunities how-
ever

ever may happen, and there may be reason as well as pretences sometimes for opposition even in such a reign, at least we will suppose so, that we may include in this argument every contingent case. Grievances then are complained of, mistakes and abuses in government are pointed out, and ministers are prosecuted by their enemies. Shall the prince on the throne form a party by intrigue, and by secret and corrupt influence, to oppose the prosecution? When the prince and the ministers are *participes criminis*, when every thing is to be defended, lest something should come out, that may unravel the silly wicked scheme, and disclose to public sight the whole turpitude of the administration; there is no help, this must be done, and such a party must be formed, because such a party alone will submit to a drudgery of this kind. But a prince, who is not in these circumstances, will not have recourse to these means. He has others more open, more noble, and more effectual in his power: he knows that the views of his government are right, and that the tenor of his administration is good; but he knows that neither he nor his ministers are infallible, nor impeccable. There may be abuses in his government,

ment, mistakes in his administration, and guilt in his ministers, which he has not observed: and he will be far from imputing the complaints, that give him occasion to observe them, to a spirit of party; much less will he treat those who carry on such prosecutions in a legal manner as incendiaries, and as enemies to his government. On the contrary, he will distinguish the voice of his people from the clamour of a faction, and will hearken to it. He will redress grievances, correct errors, and reform or punish ministers. This he will do as a good prince: and as a wise one, he will do it in such a manner that his dignity shall be maintained, and that his authority shall increase with his reputation by it.

Should the efforts of a meer faction be bent to calumniate his government, and to distress the administration on groundless pretences, and for insufficient reasons; he will not neglect, but he will not apprehend neither, the short-lived and contemptible scheme. He will indeed have no reason to do so; for let the fautors of male-administration, whenever an opposition is made to it, affect to insinuate as much as they please, that their masters
are

are in no other circumstances than those to which the very best ministers stand exposed, objects of general envy and of particular malice, it will remain eternally true, that groundless opposition, in a well-regulated monarchy, can never be strong and durable. To be convinced of the truth of this proposition, one needs only to reflect how many well-grounded attacks have been defeated, and how few have succeeded, against the most wicked and the weakest administrations. Every king of *Britain* has means enough in his power to defeat and to calm opposition. But a patriot king, above all others, may safely rest his cause on the innocency of his administration, on the constitutional strength of the crown, and on the concurrence of his people, to whom he dares appeal, and by whom he will be supported.

To conclude all I will say on the divisions of this kind, let me add, that the case of a groundless opposition can hardly happen in a bad reign, because in such a reign just occasions of opposition must of course be frequently given (as we have allowed that they may be given sometimes, tho' very rarely, in a good reign) but that
whether

whether it be well or ill grounded, whether it be that of the nation, or that of a faction, the conduct of the prince with respect to it will be the same; and one way or other this conduct must have a very fatal event. Such a prince will not mend the administration, as long as he can resist the justest and most popular opposition: and therefore this opposition will last and grow, as long as a free constitution is in force, and the spirit of liberty is preserved; for so long even a change of his ministers, without a change of his measures, will not be sufficient. The former without the latter is a meer banter, and would be deemed and taken for such, by every man who did not oppose on a factious principle; that I mean of getting into power at any rate, and using it as ill, perhaps worse than the men he helped to turn out of it. Now if such men as these abound, and they will abound in the decline of a free government, a bad prince, whether he changes, or does not change his ministers, may hope to govern by the spirit and art of a faction, against the spirit and strength of the nation. His character may be too low, and that of his minister too odious, to form originally even a faction that shall be able to defend them.

them. But they may apply to their purposes a party that was formed on far different occasions, and bring numbers to fight for a cause in which many of them would not have lifted. The names, and with the names the animosity of parties, may be kept up, when the causes that formed them subsist no longer.

When a party is thus revived or continued in the spirit of a faction, the corrupt and the infatuated members of it will act without any regard to right or wrong: and they who have asserted liberty in one reign, or opposed invasions of one kind, will give it up in another reign, and abet invasions of another kind; though they still distinguish themselves by the same appellation, still spread the same banner, and still deafen their adversaries and one another with the same cry. If the national cause prevails against all the wicked arts of corruption and division, that an obstinate prince and flagitious ministry can employ; yet will the struggle be long, and the difficulties, the distresses, and the danger great, both to the king and to the people. The best he can hope for, in such a case, will be to escape with a diminution of his reputation, authority,
and

and power. He may be exposed to something worse; and his obstinacy may force things to such extremities, as they who oppose him will lament, and as the preservation of liberty and good government can alone justify. If the wicked arts I speak of prevail, faction will be propagated through the whole nation, an ill or well-grounded opposition will be the question no longer, and the contest among parties will be who shall govern, not how they shall be governed. In short, universal confusion will follow, and a complete victory on any side will enslave all sides.

I have not overcharged the draught. Such consequences must follow such a conduct; and therefore let me ask how much more safe, more easy, more pleasant, more honourable is it, for a prince to correct, if he has not prevented male-administration? that he may be able to rest his cause, as I said before, on the strength of the crown and the concurrence of his people, whenever any faction presumes to rise in opposition to him.

This a patriot king will do. He may favour one party and discourage another, upon occasions wherein the state of his
king.

kingdom makes such a temporary measure necessary. But he will espouse none, much less will he proscribe any. He will list no party, much less will he do the meanest and most imprudent thing a king can do, list himself in any. It will be his aim to pursue true principles of government independently of all: and by a steady adherence to this measure, his reign will become an undeniable and glorious proof, that a wise and good prince may unite his subjects, and be himself the center of their union, notwithstanding any of these divisions that have been hitherto mentioned.

Let us now view the divided state of a nation in another light. In this, the divisions will appear more odious, more dangerous; less dependent on the influence, and less subject to the authority of the crown. Such will be the state, whenever a people is *divided* about *submission to their prince*, and a party is formed of spirit and strength sufficient to oppose, even in arms, the established government. But in this case, desperate as it may seem, a patriot king will not despair of reconciling, and re-uniting his subjects to himself, and to one another. He may be obliged perhaps,
as

as *Henry* the Fourth of *France* was, to conquer his own; but then like that great prince, if he is the conqueror, he will be the father too of his people. He must pursue in arms those who presume to take arms against him; but he will pursue them like rebellious children whom he seeks to reclaim, and not like irreconcilable enemies whom he endeavours to exterminate. Another prince may blow up the flame of civil war by unprovoked severity, render those zealous against him who were at worst indifferent, and determine the disaffection of others to open rebellion. When he has prevailed against the faction he helped to form, as he could not have prevailed if the bent of the nation had been against him, he may be willing to ascribe his success to a *party*, that he may have that pretence to govern by a party: and far from reconciling the minds that have been alienated from him, and re-uniting his subjects in a willing unforced submission to him, he may be content to maintain himself on that throne, where the laws of God and man have placed him, by the melancholy expedient that usurpers and tyrants, who have no other in their power, employ; the expedient of force. But a patriot king will act with

with another spirit, and entertain nobler and wiser views from first to last, and thro' the whole course of such a conjuncture. Nothing less than the hearts of his people will content such a prince, nor will he think his throne established till it is established there. That he may have time and opportunity to gain them, therefore, he will prevent the flame from breaking out, if by art and management he can do it. If he cannot, he will endeavour to keep it from spreading: and if the phrenzy of rebellion disappoints him in both these attempts, he will remember peace, like the heroic king I just now quoted, in the midst of war. Like him he will forego advantages of pushing the latter, rather than lose an opportunity of promoting the former: like him, in the heat of battle he will spare, and in the triumph of victory condescend: like him, he will beat down the violence of this flame, by his valour, and extinguish even the embers of it, by his lenity.

It may happen, that a prince, capable of holding such a conduct as this, may not have the opportunity. He may succeed to the throne after a contrary conduct has been held; and when, among other divisions

sions which male-administration and the tyranny of faction have increased and confirmed, there is one against the established government still in being, though not still in arms. The use is obvious, which a faction in power might make of such a circumstance under a weak prince, by ranking in that division all those who opposed the administration, or at least by holding out equal danger to him from two quarters, from their enemies who meant him no harm, and from his enemies who could do him none. But so gross an artifice will not impose on a prince of another character; he will soon discern the distinctions it becomes him to make. He will see, in this instance, how faction breeds, nourishes, and perpetuates faction: he will observe how far that of the court contributed to form the other, and contributes still to keep it in countenance and credit, among those who consider more what such men are against, than what they are for. He will observe, how much that of the disaffected gives pretence to the other who keeps a monopoly of power and wealth, one of which oppresses, and the other beggars, the rest of the nation: his penetration will soon discover, that these factions break in but little on the body of his people,

ple, and that it depends on him alone to take from them even the strength they have ; because that of the former is acquired entirely by his authority and purse, and that of the latter principally by the abuse which the former makes of both. Upon the whole, the measures he has to pursue towards the great object of a patriot king, the union of his people, will appear to him extremely easy. How should they be otherwise? One of the factions must be dissolved the moment that the favour of the prince is withdrawn, and the other is disarmed as soon as it is marked out. It will have no shelter, and it must therefore be so marked out, under a good and wise administration ; for whether the members of it avow their principles by refusing those tests of fidelity which the law requires, or perjure themselves by taking them, they will be known alike. One difference, and but one will be made between them in the general sense of mankind, a difference arising from the greater degree of infamy that will belong justly to the latter. The first may pass for fools : the latter must pass without excuse for knaves.

The terms I use sound harshly, but the censure is just, and it will appear to be so in the highest degree, and upon the highest reason, if we stop to make a reflection or two that deserve very well to be made, on the conduct of our Jacobites; for I desire no stronger instance on which to establish the censure, and to justify the terms I have used. Now all these, whether they swear, or whether they do not, are liable to one particular objection, that did not lye against those who were in former days enemies to the king on the throne. In the days of *York* and *Lancaster*, for instance, a man might be against the prince on the throne without being against the constitution of his country. The *constitution* conveyed the crown by *hereditary right* in the same family: and he who was a *Yorkist*, and he who was a *Lancastrian*, might, and I doubt not did, pretend in every contest to have this right on his side. The same *constitution* was acknowledged by both, and therefore so much indulgence was shewn by law to both, at least in the time of *Henry* the Seventh, that submission to a *King de facto* could not be imputed as a crime to either. Thus again, to descend lower in history; when the
exclusion

exclusion of the duke of *York* was pressed in the reign of *Charles* the Second, the right of that Prince to the Crown was not disputed. His *divine right* indeed, such a divine right as his grandfather and father had asserted before him, was not much regarded; but his right by the constitution, his *legal right*, was sufficiently owned by those who insisted on a law as necessary to barr it. But every Jacobite at this time goes beyond all these examples, and is a rebel to the *constitution* under which he is born, as well as to the *prince* on the throne. The law of his country has settled the right of succession in a *new family*. He resists this law, and asserts on his own private authority, not only a right in contradiction to it, but a right extinguished by it. This absurdity is so great, that it cannot be defended except by advancing a greater; and therefore it is urged, that no power on earth could alter the constitution in this respect, nor extinguish a right to the crown inherent in the *Stuart* family, and derived from a superior, that is from a divine authority. This kind of plea, for refusing submission to the laws of the land, if it was admitted, would serve any purpose as well as that for which it is

brought. Our fanatics urged it formerly, and I do not see why a conscientious fifth monarchy-man had not as much right to urge it formerly, as a Jacobite has now. But if conscience, that is private opinion, may excuse the fifth monarchy-man and the Jacobite, who act conformably to it, from all imputations except those of madness and folly; how shall the latter be excused when he forswears the principles he retains, acknowledges the right he renounces, takes oaths with an intent to violate them, and calls God to witness to a premeditated lie? Some casuistry has been employed to excuse these men to themselves and to others. But such casuistry, and in truth every other, destroys, by distinctions and exceptions, all morality, and effaces the essential difference between right and wrong, good and evil. This the schoolmen in general have done on many occasions; the sons of *Loyola* in particular: and I wish with all my heart that nothing of the same kind could be objected to any other divines. Some political reasoning has been employed, as well as the casuistry here spoken of, and to the same purpose. It has been said, that the conduct of those who are enemies to the establishment, to which they submit

submit and swear, is justified by the principles of the Revolution. But nothing can be more false and frivolous. By the principles of the Revolution, a subject may resist, no doubt, the prince who endeavours to ruin and enslave his people, and may push this resistance to the dethronement and exclusion of him and his race: but will it follow, that, because we may justly take arms against a prince whose right to govern we once acknowledged, and who by subsequent acts has forfeited that right, we may swear to a right we do not acknowledge, and resist a prince whose conduct has not forfeited the right we swore to, nor given any just dispensation from our oaths?

But I shall lengthen this digression no further: it is on a subject I have treated in public writings, the refutation of which never came to my hands, and, I think, never will. I return to the subject of my present discourse. And I say, that such factions as these can never create any obstruction to a prince, who pursues the union of his subjects, nor disturb the peace of his government. The men who compose them must be desperate, and impotent; the most despicable of all charac-

ters when they go together. Every honest and sensible man will distinguish himself out of their number : and they will remain, as they deserve to be, hewers of wood, and drawers of water, to the rest of their fellow subjects.

They will remain such, if they are abandoned to themselves, and to that habitual infatuation which they have not sense and spirit enough to break. But if a prince, out of goodness or policy, should think it worth his while to take them from under this influence, and to break these habits ; even this division, the most absurd of all others, will not be found incurable. A man who has not seen the inside of parties, nor had opportunities to examine nearly their secret motives, can hardly conceive how little a share, principle of any sort, though principle of some sort or other be always pretended, has in the determination of their conduct. Reason has small effect on numbers : a turn of imagination, often as violent and as sudden as a gust of wind, determines their conduct ; and passion is taken by others, and by themselves too, when it grows into habit especially, for principle. What gave strength and spirit

rit to a Jacobite party after the late king's accession? The true answer is, a sudden turn of the imaginations of a whole party, to resentment and rage, that were turned a little before to quiet submission, and patient expectation. Principle had as little share in making the turn, as reason had in conducting it. Men who had sense, and temper too before that moment, thought of nothing after it but of setting up a tory king against a whig king: and when some of them were asked, if they were sure a popish king would make a good tory king? or whether they were determined to sacrifice their religion and liberty to him? The answer was, no; that they would take arms against him if he made attempts on either; that this might be the case perhaps in six months after his restoration, but that in the mean time they would endeavour his restoration. This is no exaggerated fact: and I leave you to judge to what such sentiments and conduct must be ascribed, to principle or passion, to reason or madness? What gives obstinacy without strength, and sullenness without spirit, to the Jacobite-tories at this time? Another turn of imagination, or rather the same shewing itself in another form.

A factious habit, and a factious notion, converted into a notion of policy and honour. They are taught to believe, that by clinging together they are a considerable weight, which may be thrown in to turn the scale in any great event; and that in the mean time to be a steady suffering party, is an honour they may flatter themselves with very justly. Thus they continue steady to engagements which most of them wish in their hearts they had never taken; and suffer for principles, in support of which not one of them would venture further than talking the treason that claret inspires.

It results therefore from all that has been said, and from the reflections which these hints may suggest, that in whatever light we view the *divided state* of a people, there is none in which these divisions will appear incurable, nor an union of the members of a great community with one another, and with their head, unattainable. It may happen in this case, as it does in many others, that things uncommon may pass for improbable or impossible: and as nothing can be more uncommon than a patriot king, there will be no room to wonder if the natural and certain

certain effects of his conduct should appear improbable or impossible to many. But there is still something more in this case. Tho' the union we speak of be so much for the interest of every king and every people, that their glory and their prosperity must increase, or diminish, in proportion as they approach nearer to it, or are further removed from it; yet is there another interest, by which princes and people both are often imposed upon so far as to mistake it for their own. The interest I mean is that of *private ambition*. It would be easy to shew in many instances, and particularly in this, of uniting instead of dividing, and of governing by a national concurrence instead of governing by the management of parties and factions in the state, how widely different, nay how repugnant the interests of *private ambition* and those of *real patriotism* are. Men therefore who are warmed by the first, and have no sense of the last, will declare for *division*, as they do for *corruption*, in opposition to *union* and to *integrity* of government. They will not indeed declare directly that the two former are in the abstract preferable, but they will affirm with great airs of sufficiency that both are incurable; and con-

clude from hence, that in practice it is necessary to comply with both. This subterfuge once open, there is no false and immoral measure, in political management, which may not be avowed and recommended. But the very men who hope to escape by opening it, shut it up again, and secure their own condemnation, when they labour to *confirm* divisions, and to *propagate* corruption, and thereby to *create* the very *necessity* that they plead in their excuse. Necessity of this kind there is in reality none; for it seems full as absurd to say, that popular divisions must be cultivated, because popular union cannot be procured, as it would be to say that poison must be poured into a wound, because it cannot be healed. The practice of morality in private life will never arrive at ideal perfection: must we give up ourselves therefore to all manner of immorality? And must those who are charged with our instruction endeavour to make us the most profligate of men, because they cannot make us saints?

Experience of the depravity of human nature made men desirous to unite in society and under government, that they might defend themselves the better against

gainst injuries: but the same depravity soon inspired to some the design of employing societies to invade and spoil societies; and to disturb the peace of the great common-wealth of mankind, with more force and effect in such collective bodies, than they could do individually. Just so it happens in the domestic oeconomy of particular states: and their peace is disturbed by the same passions. Some of their members content themselves with the common benefits of society, and employ all their industry to promote the public good: but some propose to themselves a separate interest, and, that they may pursue it the more effectually, they associate with others. Thus *factions* are in them, what *nations* are in the world. They invade and rob one another: and while each pursues a separate interest, the common interest is sacrificed by them all; that of mankind in one case, that of some particular community in the other. This has been and must always be in some measure the course of human affairs, especially in free countries, where the passions of men are less restrained by authority: and I am not wild enough to suppose that a patriot

king can change human nature. But I am reasonable enough to suppose, that without altering human nature he may give a check to this course of human affairs, in his own kingdom at least; that he may defeat the designs, and break the spirit of faction, instead of partaking in one, and assuming the other; and that if he cannot render the union of his subjects universal, he may render it so general, as to answer all the ends of good government, private security, public tranquillity, wealth, power, and fame.

If these ends were ever answered, they were so, surely, in this country, in the days of our ELIZABETH. She found her kingdom full of factions, and factions of another consequence and danger than these of our days, whom she would have dispersed with a puff of her breath. She could not re-unite them, it is true: the papist continued a papist, the puritan a puritan; one furious, the other sullen. But she united the great body of the people in her and their *common interest*, she inflamed them with *one national spirit*, and thus armed, she maintained tranquillity at home, and carried succour to her friends

friends and terror to her enemies abroad. There were cabals at her court, and intrigues among her ministers. It is said too that she did not dislike that there should be such. But these were kept within her court. They could not creep abroad, to sow division among her people: and her greatest favourite the earl of ESSEX paid the price of attempting it with his head. Let our great doctors in politics, who preach so learnedly on the trite text *divide & impera*, compare the conduct of ELIZABETH in this respect with that of her suecessor, who endeavoured to govern his kingdom by the notions of a *faction* that he raised, and to manage his *parliament* by *undertakers*: and they must be very obstinate indeed, if they refuse to acknowledge, that a wise and good prince can unite a divided people, tho' a weak and wicked prince cannot; and that the consequences of national union, are glory and happiness to the prince and to the people, whilst those of dis-union bring shame and misery on both, and entail them too on posterity.

I have dwelt long on the last head, not only because it is of great importance in itself, and at all times, but because it is rendered

rendered more so than ever at this time, by the unexampled avowal of contrary principles. Hitherto it has been thought the highest pitch of profligacy to own, instead of concealing crimes, and to take pride in them, instead of being ashamed of them. But in our age men have soared to a pitch still higher. The first is common, it is the practice of numbers, and by their numbers they keep one another in countenance. But the choice spirits of these days, the men of mode in politics, are far from stopping where criminals of all kinds have stopt when they have gone even to this point; for generally the most hardened of the inhabitants of *Newgate* do not go so far. The men I speak of contend, that it is not enough to be vicious by *practice* and *habit*, but that it is necessary to be so by *principle*. They make themselves missionaries of faction as well as of corruption: they recommend both, they deride all such as imagine it possible or fit, to retain truth, integrity, and a disinterested regard to the public in public life, and pronounce every man a fool who is not ready to act like a knave. I hope that enough has been said, tho' much more might have been said, to expose the wickedness of
of

of these men, and the absurdity of their schemes; and to shew that a patriot king may walk more easily and successfully in other paths of government, *per tutum planumque iter religionis, justitiæ, honestatis, virtutumque moralium*. Let me proceed, therefore, to mention two other heads of the conduct that such a king will hold, and it shall be my endeavour not to fall into the same prolixity.

A king who esteems it his duty to support, or to restore, if that be needful, the free constitution of a limited monarchy; who forms and maintains a wise and good administration; who subdues faction, and promotes the union of his people; and who makes their greatest good the constant object of his government, may be said, no doubt, to be in the true interest of his kingdom. All the particular cases that can arise are included in these general characteristics of a wise and good reign. And yet it seems proper to mention, under a distinct head, some particular instances that have not been touched, wherein this wisdom and goodness will exert themselves.

Now

Now tho' the true interest of several states may be the same in many respects, yet is there always some difference to be perceived by a discerning eye, both in these interests, and in the manner of pursuing them; a difference that arises from the situation of countries, from the character of people, from the nature of government, and even from that of climate and soil; from circumstances that are like these permanent, and from others that may be deemed more accidental. To illustrate all this by examples, would be easy, but long. I shall content myself therefore to mention, in some instances only, the difference that arises, from the causes referred to, between the true interest of our country, and that of some or all our neighbours on the continent; and leave you to extend and apply in your thoughts the comparison I shall hint at, rather than enlarge upon.

The situation of *Great Britain*, the character of her people, and the nature of her government fit her for trade and commerce. Her climate and her soil make them necessary to her well being. By trade and commerce we grew a rich and

and powerful nation, and by their decay we are growing poor and impotent. As trade and commerce enrich, so they fortify our country. The sea is our barrier, ships are our fortresses, and the mariners, that trade and commerce alone can furnish, are the garrisons to defend them. *France* lies under great disadvantages in trade and commerce by the nature of her government. Her advantages in situation are as great at least as ours. Those that arise from the temper and character of her people are a little different perhaps, and yet upon the whole equivalent. Those of her climate and her soil are superior to ours, and indeed to those of any *European* nation. The United Provinces have the same advantages that we have in the nature of their government, more perhaps in the temper and character of their people, less to be sure in their situation, climate, and soil. But without descending into a longer detail of the advantages and disadvantages attending each of these nations in trade and commerce, it is sufficient for my present purpose to observe, that *Great Britain* stands in a certain middle between the other two, with regard to *wealth* and *power* arising from these springs.

sgrings. A less, and a less constant, application to the improvement of these may serve the ends of *France*; a greater is necessary in this country; and a greater still in *Holland*. The *French* may improve their natural wealth and power by the improvement of trade and commerce. We can have no wealth, no power by consequence, as *Europe* is now constituted, without the improvement of them, nor in any degree but proportionably to this improvement. The *Dutch* cannot subsist without them. They bring wealth to other nations, and are necessary to the well being of them; but they supply the *Dutch* with food and raiment, and are necessary even to their being.

The result of what has been said is, *in general*, that the wealth and power of all nations depending so much on their trade and commerce, and every nation being, like the three I have mentioned, in such different circumstances of advantage or disadvantage in the pursuit of this common interest; a good government, and therefore the government of a patriot king, will be directed constantly to make the most of every advantage that nature has given, or art can procure towards the

im-

improvement of trade and commerce. And this is one of the principal criterions, by which we are to judge whether governors are in the true interest of the people, or not.

It results, *in particular*, that *Great Britain* might improve her wealth and power in a proportion superior to that of any nation who can be deemed her rival, if the advantages she has were as wisely cultivated, as they will be in the reign of a patriot king. To be convinced more thoroughly of this truth a very short process of reasoning will suffice. Let any man, who has knowledge enough for it, first compare the natural state of *Great Britain*, and of the United Provinces, and then their artificial state together; that is, let him consider minutely the advantages we have by the situation, extent, and nature of our island, over the inhabitants of a few salt marshes gained on the sea, and hardly defended from it: and after that, let him consider how nearly these provinces have raised themselves to an equality of wealth and power with the kingdom of *Great Britain*. From whence arises this difference of improvement? It arises plainly from hence: the *Dutch* have

have been, from the foundation of their common-wealth, a nation of *patriots* and *merchants*. The spirit of that people has not been diverted from these two objects, the defence of their liberty, and the improvement of their trade and commerce; which have been carried on by them with uninterrupted and unslackened application, industry, order, and oeconomy. In *Great Britain* the case has not been the same, in either respect; but here we confine ourselves to speak of the last alone.

Trade and commerce, such as they were in those days, had been sometimes, and in some instances, before the reign of *Queen ELIZABETH*, encouraged and improved: but the great encouragements were given, the great extensions and improvements were made, by that glorious princess. To her we owe that spirit of domestic and foreign trade which is not quite extinguished. It was she who gave that rapid motion to our whole mercantile system which is not entirely ceased. They both flagged under her successor; were not revived under his son; were checked, diverted, clogged, and interrupted, during our civil wars: and began to exert new vigour after the restoration in a long course of peace; but met with

with new difficulties too from the confirmed rivalry of the *Dutch*, and the growing rivalry of the *French*. To one of these the pusillanimous character of JAMES the first gave many scandalous occasions: and the other was favoured by the conduct of CHARLES the second, who never was in the true interest of the people he governed. From the revolution to the death of queen ANNE, however trade and commerce might be aided and encouraged in other respects, they were necessarily subjected to depredations abroad, and over-loaded by taxes at home, during the course of two great wars. From the accession of the late king to this hour, in the midst of a full peace, the debts of the nation continue much the same, the taxes have been encreased, and for eighteen years of this time we have tamely suffered continual depredations from the most contemptible maritime power in *Europe*, that of *Spain*.

A patriot king will neither neglect, nor sacrifice his country's interest. No other interest, neither a foreign nor a domestic, neither a public nor a private, will influence his conduct in government. He will not multiply taxes wantonly,
nor

nor keep up those unnecessarily which necessity has laid, that he may keep up legions of tax-gatherers. He will not continue national debts by all sorts of political and other profusion; nor, more wickedly still, by a settled purpose of oppressing and impoverishing the people, that he may with greater ease corrupt some, and govern the whole, according to the dictates of his passions and arbitrary will. To give ease and encouragement to manufactory at home, to assist and protect trade abroad, to improve and keep in heart the national colonies, like so many farms of the mother-country, will be principal and constant parts of the attention of such a prince. The wealth of the nation he will most justly esteem to be his wealth, the power his power, the security and the honour, his security and honour: and, by the very means by which he promotes the two first, he will wisely preserve the two last; for by these means, and by these alone, can the great advantage of the *situation* of this kingdom be taken and improved.

Great Britain is an island: and whilst nations on the continent are at immense charge in maintaining their barriers, and perpetually

perpetually on their guard, and frequently embroiled to extend or strengthen them, *Great Britain* may, if her governours please, accumulate wealth in maintaining hers; make herself secure from invasions, and be ready to invade others when her own immediate interest or the general interest of *Europe* require it. Of all which Queen ELIZABETH's reign is a memorable example, and undeniable proof. I said the *general interest* of *Europe*, because it seems to me that this alone should call our councils off from an almost entire application to their domestic and proper business. Other nations must watch over every motion of their neighbours; penetrate, if they can, every design; foresee every minute event, and take part by some engagement or other in almost every conjuncture that arises. But as we cannot be easily nor suddenly attacked, and as we ought not to aim at any acquisition of territory on the continent, it may be our interest to watch the secret workings of the several councils abroad; to advise, and warn; to abet, and oppose: but it never can be our true interest easily and officiously to enter into action, much less into engagements that imply action and expence. Other nations,

tions, like the *Velites* or light-armed troops, stand foremost in the field, and skirmish perpetually. When a great war begins, we ought to look on the powers of the continent, to whom we incline, like the two first lines, the *Principes* and *Hastati* of a Roman army; and on ourselves, like the *Triarii*, that are not to charge with these legions on every occasion, but to be ready for the conflict whenever the fortune of the day, be it sooner or later, calls us to it, and the sum of things, or the *general interest*, makes it necessary.

This is that *post of advantage* and *honour*, which our singular situation among the powers of *Europe* determines us, or should determine us, to take, in all disputes that happen on the Continent. If we neglect it, and dissipate our strength on occasions that touch us remotely or indirectly; we are governed by men who do not know the true interest of this island, or who have some other interest more at heart. If we adhere to it, so at least as to deviate little and seldom from it, as we shall do whenever we are wisely and honestly governed, then will this nation make her proper figure, and a great one
it

it will be. By a continual attention to improve her natural, that is her maritime strength, by collecting all her forces within herself, and reserving them to be laid out on great occasions, such as regard her immediate interests and her honour, or such as are truly important to the general system of power in *Europe*; she may be the *arbitrator* of *differences*, the *guardian* of *liberty*, and the *preserver* of that *Balance*, which has been so much talked of, and is so little understood.

“ Are we never to be soldiers? you will say. Yes, constantly, in such proportion as is necessary for the defence of good government. To establish such a military force as none but bad governours can want, is to establish tyrannical power in the king or in the ministers; and may be wanted by the latter, when the former would be secure without his army, if he broke his minister. Occasionally too we must be soldiers, and for offence as well as defence; but in proportion to the nature of the conjuncture, considered always relatively to the difference here insisted upon, between our situation, our interest, and the nature of our strength, compared with those of the other pow-

H

ers

ers of *Europe*; and not in proportion to the desires, or even to the wants, of the nations with whom we are confederated. Like other amphibious animals, we must come occasionally on shore: but the water is more properly our element, and in it, like them, as we find our greatest security, so we exert our greatest force.

What I touch upon here, very shortly, deserves to be considered, and reconsidered, by every man who has, or may have any share in the government of *Great Britain*. For we have not only departed too much from our true national interest in this respect; but we have done so with the general applause even of well-meaning men, who did not discern that we wasted our selves by an improper application of our strength in conjunctures, when we might have served the common cause far more usefully, nay with entire effect, by a proper application of our natural strength. There was something more than this. Armies grew so much into fashion in time of war, among men who meant well to their country, that they who mean ill to it have kept, and keep them still up in the profoundest peace: and the
number

A PATRIOT KING. 171

number of our soldiers, in this island alone, is almost double to that of our seamen. That they are kept up against foreign enemies, cannot be said with any colour. If they are kept for shew, they are ridiculous. If they are kept for any other purpose whatever, they are too dangerous to be suffered. A patriot king, seconded by ministers attached to the true interest of their country, would soon reform this abuse, and save a great part of this expence; or apply it in a manner preferable even to the saving it, to the maintainance of a body of marine foot, and to the charge of a register of thirty or forty thousand seamen. But no thoughts like these, no great designs for the honour and interest of the kingdom, will be entertained, till men who have this honour and interest at heart arise to power.

I come now to the last head, under which I shall consider the character and conduct of a patriot king: and let it not be thought to be of the least importance, tho' it may seem at the first mention to concern appearances rather than realities, and to be nothing more than a circumstance contained in or implied by the great parts of the character and conduct

of such a king. It is of his personal behaviour, of his manner of living with other men, and, in a word, of his private as well as public life that I mean to speak. It is of that decency and grace, that *bienféance* of the *French*, that decorum of the *Latins*, that *εὐπρεπία* of the *Greeks*, which can never be reflected on any character that is not laid in virtue: but for want of which, a character that is so laid will lose at all times part of the lustre belonging to it, and may be sometimes not a little mis-understood and under-valued. *Beauty* is not separable from *health*, nor this *lustre*, said the stoics, from *virtue*: but as a man may be *healthful* without being *handsome*, so he may be *virtuous* without being *amiable*.

There are certain finishing strokes, a last hand as we commonly say, to be given to all the works of art. When that is not given, we may see the excellency of a general design, and the beauty of some particular parts. A judge of the art may see further; he may allow for what is wanting, and discern the full merit of a compleat work in one that is imperfect. But vulgar eyes will not be so struck. The work will appear to them defec-

defective, because unfinished: so that without knowing precisely what they dislike, they may admire, but they will not be pleased. Thus in moral characters, tho' every part be virtuous and great, or tho' the few and small defects in it be concealed under the blaze of those shining qualities that compensate for them; yet is not this enough even in private life: it is less so in public life, and still less so, in that of a prince.

There is a certain *species liberalis*, more easily understood than explained, and felt than defined, that must be acquired and rendered habitual to him. A certain propriety of words and actions, that results from their conformity to nature and character, must always accompany him, and create an air and manner, that run uniformly thro' the whole tenour of his conduct and behaviour: which air and manner are so far from any kind or degree of affectation, that they cannot be attained except by him who is void of all affectation. We may illustrate this to ourselves, and make it more sensible, by reflecting on the conduct of good dramatic or epic writers. They draw the characters which they bring on the scene from

H 3

nature,

nature, they sustain them thro' the whole piece, and make their actors neither say nor do any thing that is not exactly proper to the character each of them represents. *Oderint dum metuant*, came properly out of the mouth of a tyrant; but EURIPIDES would never have put that execrable sentence into the mouth of MINOS or ÆACUS.

A man of sense and virtue both will not fall into any great impropriety of character, or indecency of conduct. But he may slide or be surprized into small ones, from a thousand reasons, and in a thousand manners, which I shall not stay to enumerate. Against these, therefore, even men, who are incapable of falling into the others, must be still on their guard, and no men so much as princes. When their minds are filled and their hearts warmed with *true notions* of government, when they *know their duty*, and *love their people*, they will not fail in the *great* parts they are to act, in the council, in the field, and in all the arduous affairs that belong to their kingly office: at least they will not *begin* to fail, by failing in *them*. But as they are men, susceptible of the same impressions, liable
to

to the same errors, and exposed to the same passions, so they are likewise exposed to more and stronger temptations, than others. Besides, the elevation in which they are placed, as it gives them great advantages, gives them great disadvantages too, that often countervail the former. Thus for instance, a little *merit* in a prince is seen and felt by numbers; it is multiplied as it were, and in proportion to this effect his reputation is raised by it. But then a little *failing* is seen and felt by numbers too; it is multiplied in the same manner, and his reputation sinks in the same proportion.

I spoke above of defects that may be concealed under the blaze of great and shining qualities. This may be the case; it has been that of some princes. There goes a tradition, that HENRY the Fourth of *France* asked a *Spanish* ambassador, what mistresses the king of *Spain* had? The ambassador replied (like a formal pedant) that his master was a prince who feared God, and had no mistress but the queen. HENRY the Fourth felt the reflexion, and asked him in return with some contempt, "Whether his master
H 4 " had

"had not virtues enough to cover one
"vice?"

The faults or defects that may be thus covered or compensated, are, I think, those of the man, rather than those of the king; such as arise from constitution, and the *natural* rather than the *moral* character; such as may be deemed accidental starts of passion, or accidental remissions in some unguarded hours; surprises, if I may say so, of the man on the king. When these happen seldom, and pass soon, they may be hid, like spots in the sun, but they are spots still. He, who has the means of seeing them, will see them: and he, who has not, may feel the effects of them without knowing precisely the cause. When they continue (for here is the danger, because, if they *continue*, they will *increase*) they are spots no longer: they spread a general shade, and obscure the light in which they were drowned before. The virtues of the king are lost in the vices of the man.

ALEXANDER had violent passions, and those for wine and women were predominant, after his ambition. They were
spots

tues, to disguise his failings and his vices, and by his example and authority to keep a veil drawn over the futility and debauch of his court.

His successor, not to the throne, but to the sovereign power, was a mere rake, with some wit, and no morals; nay, with so little regard to them, that he made them a subject of ridicule in discourse, and appeared in his whole conduct more profligate, if that could be, than he was in principle. The difference between these characters soon appeared in abominable effects; such as cruelty apart, might recal the memory of *Nero*, or in the other sex, that of *Messalina*, and such as I leave the chroniclers of scandal to relate.

Our ELIZABETH was queen in a limited monarchy, and reigned over a people at all times more easily led than driven; and at that time capable of being attached to their prince and their country, by a more generous principle than any of those which prevail in our days, by *affection*. There was a strong *prerogative* then in being, and the crown was in possession of greater legal power. Popularity was however

however then (as it is now, and as it must be always in mixed government) the sole true foundation of that sufficient authority and influence, which other constitutions give the prince *gratis*, and *independently* of the people, but which a king of this nation must *acquire*. The wise queen saw it, and she saw too how much popularity depends on those appearances, that depend on the decorum, the decency, the grace, and the propriety of behaviour of which we are speaking. A warm concern for the interest and honour of the nation, a tenderness for her people, and a confidence in their affections, were appearances that run thro' her whole public conduct, and gave life and colour to it. She did great things, and she knew how to set them off according to their full value, by her manner of doing them. In her *private behaviour* she shewed great affability, she descended even to familiarity; but her familiarity was such as could not be imputed to her *weakness*, and was therefore most justly ascribed to her *goodness*. Tho' a woman, she hid all that was womanish about her; and if a few equivocal marks of coquetry appeared on some occasions,

occasions, they passed like flashes of lightning, vanished as soon as they were discerned, and imprinted no blot on her character. She had private *friendships*, she had *favourites*: but she never suffered her *friends* to forget she was their queen; and when her *favourites* did, she made them feel that she was so.

Her successor had no virtues to set off, but he had failings and vices to conceal. He could not conceal the latter; and, void of the former, he could not compensate for them. His failings and his vices therefore standing in full view, he passed for a weak prince and an ill man; and fell into all the contempt wherein his memory remains to this day. The methods he took, to preserve himself from it, served but to confirm him in it. No man can keep the decorum of manners in life, who is not free from every kind of *affectation*, as it has been said already: but he who affects what he has no pretensions to, or what is improper to his character and rank in the world, is guilty of most consummate folly: he becomes doubly ungracious, doubly indecent, and quite ridiculous. JAMES the first, not having one quality to conciliate the esteem or affection

tion of his people to him, endeavoured to impose on their understandings; and to create a respect for himself, by spreading the most extravagant notions about *kings* in general, as if they were *middle beings* between God and other men; and by comparing the extent and unsearchable mysteries of their *power* and *prerogative* to those of the divine providence. His *language* and his *behaviour* were commonly suited to such foolish pretensions; and thus by assuming a claim to such respect and submission as were not due to him, he lost a great part of what was due to him. In short, he begun at the wrong end; for tho' the shining qualities of the king may cover some failings and some vices that do not grow up to strong habits in the man, yet must the character of a *great and good king* be founded in that of a *great and good man*. A king who lives out of the sight of his subjects, or is never seen by them except on his throne, can scarce be despised as a man, tho' he may be hated as a king. But the king who lives more in their sight, and more under their observation, may be despised before he is hated, and even without being hated. This happened to king JAMES: a thousand circumstances brought it to pass, and

and none more than the *indecent weaknesses* he had for his *minions*. He did not endeavour to cure this contempt and raise his character, only by affecting what he had no pretensions to, as in the former case; but he endeavoured likewise most vainly to do it by affecting what was improper to his character and rank. He did not endeavour indeed to disguise his natural *pusillanimity* and *timidity* under the mask of a bully, whilst he was imposed upon and insulted by all his neighbours, and above all by the *Spaniards*; but he retailed the scraps of *Buchanan*, affected to talk much, figured in church-controversies, and put on all the pedantic appearances of a scholar, whilst he neglected all those of a great and good man, as well as king.

Let not princes flatter themselves. They will be examined closely in *private* as well as in *public life*: and those who cannot pierce further will judge of them by the appearances they give in both. To obtain true popularity, that which is founded in esteem and affection, they must therefore maintain their characters in *both*; and to that end neglect appearances in neither, but observe the *decorum* necessary

cessary to preserve the esteem, whilst they win the affections of mankind. *Kings*, they must never forget that they are *men*: *men*, they must never forget that they are *kings*. The sentiments which one of these reflexions of course inspires will give an humane and affable air to their whole behaviour, and make them taste in that high elevation all the joys of social life. The sentiments that the other reflexion suggests will be found very compatible with the former; and they may never forget that they are *kings*, tho' they do not always carry the crown on their heads, nor the sceptre in their hands. *Vanity* and *folly* must entrench themselves in a constant affectation of state to preserve regal dignity: a *wise* prince will know how to preserve it when he lays his majesty aside. He will *dare* to appear a private man, and in that character he will draw to himself a respect less ostentatious, but more real and more pleasing to him, than any which is paid to the monarch. By never *saying* what is unfit for him to say, he will never *bear* what is unfit for him to hear. By never *doing* what is unfit for him to do, he will never *see* what is unfit for him to see. Decency and propriety of manners are so far from

from lessening the pleasures of life, that they refine them, and give them an higher taste: they are so far from restraining the free and easy commerce of social life, that they banish the bane of it, licentiousness of behaviour. *Ceremony* is the barrier against this abuse of liberty in public; *politeness* and *decency* are so in private: and the prince, who practises and exacts them, will amuse himself much better, and oblige those who have the honour to be in his intimacy, and to share his pleasures with him, much more, than he could possibly do by the most *absolute* and *unguarded familiarity*.

That which is here recommended to princes, that constant guard on their own behaviour even in private life, and that constant decorum which their example ought to exact from others, will not be found so difficult in practice as may be imagined; if they use a proper discernment in the *choice* of the *persons* whom they admit to the nearest degrees of intimacy with them. A prince should chuse his *companions* with as great care as his *ministers*. If he trusts the *business* of his state to these, he trusts his *character* to those: and his character will depend on theirs

theirs much more than is commonly thought. General experience will lead men to judge that a similitude of character determined the choice; even when chance, indulgence to assiduity, good nature, or want of reflection had their share in the introduction of men unworthy of such favour. But, in such cases, certain it is that they, who judged wrong at first concerning him, will judge right at last. He is not a trifler, for instance. Be it so: but if he takes trifling futile creatures, men of mean characters, or of no character, into his intimacy, he shews a disposition to become such, and will become such, unless he breaks these habits early, and before puerile amusements are grown up to be the business of his life. I mean that the minds of princes, like the minds of other men, will be *brought down* insensibly to the *tone* of the company they keep.

A worse consequence even than this may follow a want of discernment in princes how to chuse their companions, and how to conduct themselves in private life. Silly kings have resigned themselves to their *ministers*, have suffered these to stand between them and their people,
and

and have formed no judgments, nor taken any measures on their own knowledge, but all implicitly on the representations made to them by their ministers. Kings of superior capacity have resigned themselves in the same manner to their *favourites*, male and female, have suffered these to stand between them and their most able and faithful counsellors: their judgments have been influenced, and their measures directed by insinuations of women, or of men as little fitted as women, by nature and education, to be hearkened to, in the great affairs of government. History is full of such examples; all melancholy, many tragical! sufficient, one would imagine, to deter princes, if attended to, from permitting the companions of their idle hours, or the instruments of their pleasures, to exceed the bounds of those provinces. Should a minister of state pretend to vie with any of these, about the forms of a *drawing room*, the regulation of a *ruelle*, the decoration of a *ball*, or the dress of a *fine lady*, he would be thought ridiculous, and he would be truly so. But then are not any of these impertinent, when they presume to meddle in things at least as much *above* them, as those that have been mentioned are *be-*

low the others? And are not princes who suffer them to do so, unaccountably weak?

What shall I say further on this head? Nothing more is necessary. Let me wind it up therefore by asserting this great truth, that results from what has been already said: As he can never fill the character of a patriot king, tho' his personal great and good qualities be in every other respect equal to it, who lies open to the flattery of *courtiers*, to the seduction of *women*, and to the partialities and affections which are easily contracted by too great indulgence in private life; so the prince who is desirous to establish this character, must observe such a decorum, and keep such a guard on himself, as may prevent even the *suspicion* of being liable to such influences. For as the reality would ruin, the very suspicion will lessen him in the opinion of mankind: and the opinion of mankind, which is *fame* after death, is superior *strength* and *power* in life.

AND now, if the principles and measures of conduct, laid down in this discourse, as necessary to constitute that greatest and most glorious of human beings,

ings, a patriot king, be sufficient to this purpose; let us consider too how *easy* it is, or ought to be, to establish them in the minds of princes. They are founded on true propositions, all of which are obvious, nay, many of them self-evident. They are confirmed by universal experience. In a word, no understanding can resist them, and none but the weakest can fail, or be misled, in the application of them. To a prince whose heart is corrupt, it is in vain to speak, and for such a prince I would not be thought to write. But if the heart of a prince be not corrupt, these truths will find an easy ingress thro' the understanding to it. Let us consider again, what the sure, the necessary effects of such principles and measures of conduct must be, to the prince, and to the people. On this subject let the imagination range thro' the whole glorious scene of a patriot reign: the beauty of the idea will inspire those transports, which PLATO imagined the vision of virtue would inspire, if virtue could be seen. What in truth can be so lovely? what so venerable, as to contemplate a king on whom the eyes of a whole people are fixed, filled with admiration, and glowing with affection? a king, in the temper

of whose government, like that of NERVA, things so seldom allied as empire and liberty are intimately mixed, co-exist together inseparably, and constitute one real essence? What spectacle can be presented to the view of the mind so rare, so nearly divine, as a king possessed of absolute power, neither usurped by fraud nor maintained by force, but the genuine effect of esteem, of confidence, and affection; the free gift of *liberty*, who finds her greatest security in this power, and would desire no other if the prince on the throne could be, what his people wish him to be, immortal. Of such a prince, and of such a prince alone, it may be said with strict propriety and truth,

Volentes

*Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat
Olympi.*

Civil fury will have no place in this draught: or, if the monster is seen, he must be seen as *Virgil* describes him,

Centum vinctus catenis

*Post tergum nodis, fremit horridus ore
cruento.*

He

A PATRIOT KING. 197

He must be seen subdued, bound, chained, and deprived entirely of power to do hurt. In his place, concord will appear, brooding peace and prosperity on the happy land ; joy sitting in every face, content in every heart ; a people unoppressed, undisturbed, unalarmed ; busy to improve their private property and the public stock ; fleets covering the ocean ; bringing home wealth by the returns of industry ; carrying assistance or terror abroad by the direction of wisdom ; and asserting triumphantly the right and the honour of *Great Britain*, as far as waters roll and as winds can waft them.

Those who live to see such happy days, and to act in so glorious a scene, will perhaps call to mind with some tenderness of sentiment, when he is no more, a *man*, who contributed his mite to carry on so good a work, and who desired life for nothing so much, as to see a king of *Great Britain* the most popular man in his country, and a *patriot king* at the head of an united people.

LETTER III.

Of the State of PARTIES at the Accession of King GEORGE I.

I Perceive by yours that my discourse of the character and conduct of a patriot king, in that article which relates to *party*, has not entirely satisfied your expectations. You expected, from some things that I remember to have said to you in conversation, and others that have fallen on that occasion from my pen, a more particular application of those general reasonings to the present time, and to the state of parties, from the late king's accession to the throne. The subject is delicate enough, and yet I shall speak upon it what *truth* exacts from me, with the utmost frankness : for I know all our
parties

parties too well, to esteem any ; and I am too old, and too resigned to my fate, to want, or to fear any.

Whatever anecdotes you have been told, for you are too young to have seen the passages of the times I am going to mention, and whatever prepossessions you have had, take these facts for undoubted truths: that there was no design on foot during the four last years of queen ANNE's reign to set aside the succession of the house of *Hanover*, and to place the crown on the head of the pretender to it; nor any party formed for this purpose at the time of the death of that princess, whose memory I honour, and therefore feel a just indignation at the irreverence with which we have seen it treated. If such a design had been on foot during that time, there were moments when the execution of it would not have been difficult, or dangerous enough, to have stopped men of the most moderate resolution. Neither could a design of that nature have been carried on so long, tho' it was not carried into execution, without leaving some traces, which would have appeared when such strict inquiries were made; when the papers of so many of the queen's servants were seized, and even her own pa-

I 4 pers,

pers, even those she had sealed up to be burnt after her death, were exposed to so much indecent inspection. But laying aside all arguments of the probable kind, I deny the fact absolutely: and I have the better title to expect credit, because it could not be true without my knowledge, or at least suspicion of it; and because even they who believe it, for all who asserted it did not believe it, had no proof to produce, nor have to this hour, but vain surmises; nor any authority to rest upon, but the clamour of party.

That there were particular men, who corresponded indirectly and directly too with the pretender, and with others for his service; that these men professed themselves to be zealous in it, and made large promises, and raised some faint hopes, I cannot doubt; tho' this was unknown to me at that time, or at least I knew it not with the same certainty and in the same detail that I have known it since. But if this was done by some who were in the queen's service, it was done too by some who were out of it, and I think with little sincerity by either.

It may well seem strange to one who carries in his breast a heart like yours,
that

that men of any rank, and especially of the highest, should hold a conduct so false, so dangerous, always of uncertain event, and often, as it was in the case here mentioned, upon remote contingencies, and such as they themselves think the least probable. Even I think it strange, who have been much longer mingled in a corrupt world, and who have seen many more examples of the folly, of the cunning, and the perfidy of mankind. A great regard to wealth, and a total contempt of virtue, are sentiments very nearly allied: and they must possess the whole souls of men whom they can determine to such infamous duplicity, to such double treachery. In fact they do so. *One* is so afraid of losing his fortune, that he lays in claims to secure it, perhaps to augment it, on all sides, and to prevent even imaginary dangers. *Another* values so little the inward testimony of a good conscience, or the future reproaches of those he has deceived, that he scruples not to make engagements for a time to come: that he has no design to keep; if they may serve as expedients to facilitate, in any small degree, the success of an immediate project. All this was done at the time, on the occasion, and by the persons I intend. But the scheme of defeating

pers, even those she had sealed up to be burnt after her death, were exposed to so much indecent inspection. But laying aside all arguments of the probable kind, I deny the fact absolutely: and I have the better title to expect credit, because it could not be true without my knowledge, or at least suspicion of it; and because even they who believe it, for all who asserted it did not believe it, had no proof to produce, nor have to this hour, but vain surmises; nor any authority to rest upon, but the clamour of party.

That there were particular men, who corresponded indirectly and directly too with the pretender, and with others for his service; that these men professed themselves to be zealous in it, and made large promises, and raised some faint hopes, I cannot doubt; tho' this was unknown to me at that time, or at least I knew it not with the same certainty and in the same detail that I have known it since. But if this was done by some who were in the queen's service, it was done too by some who were out of it, and I think with little sincerity by either.

It may well seem strange to one who carries in his breast a heart like yours,
that

that men of any rank, and especially of the highest, should hold a conduct so false, so dangerous, always of uncertain event, and often, as it was in the case here mentioned, upon remote contingencies, and such as they themselves think the least probable. Even I think it strange, who have been much longer mingled in a corrupt world, and who have seen many more examples of the folly, of the cunning, and the perfidy of mankind. A great regard to wealth, and a total contempt of virtue, are sentiments very nearly allied: and they must possess the whole souls of men whom they can determine to such infamous duplicity, to such double treachery. In fact they do so. *One* is so afraid of losing his fortune, that he lays in claims to secure it, perhaps to augment it, on all sides, and to prevent even imaginary dangers. *Another* values so little the inward testimony of a good conscience, or the future reproaches of those he has deceived, that he scruples not to make engagements for a time to come that he has no design to keep; if they may serve as expedients to facilitate, in any small degree, the success of an immediate project. All this was done at the time, on the occasion, and by the persons I intend. But the scheme of defeating
I 5 the

the Protestant succession was so far from being laid by the queen and her ministers, and such a resolution was so far from being taken, that the very men I speak of, when they were pressed by the other side, that is from *Versailles* and *St. Germain's*, to be more particular, and to come into a closer concert, declined both, and gave the most evasive answers.

A little before, or about the time of the queen's death, some other persons, who figured afterwards in the rebellion, entered in good earnest into those engagements, as I believe; for I do not know exactly the date of them. But whenever they took them, they took them as *single men*. They could answer for no *party* to back them. They might flatter themselves with hopes and dreams, like POMPEY, if little men and little things may be compared with great, of legions ready to rise at the stamp of their feet. But they had no assurance, no nor grounds to expect any troops, except those of the highlands; whose disposition in general was known to every man, but whose insurrection without the concurrence of other insurrections, and other troops, was deemed, even by those that made them take arms afterwards, not a strength but a weakness,

weakness, ruin to the poor people, and ruin to the cause. In a word, these men were so truly single in their engagements, and their measures were so unripe for action when the resolution of acting immediately was taken by them, that I am persuaded they durst not communicate their design to any one man of consequence that served at that time with them. What persuades me of it is this: one man, whom they thought likely to incline to them on several accounts, they attempted indirectly and at a great distance: they came no nearer to the point with him, neither then, that is just before the queen's death, nor afterwards. They had indeed no encouragement to do it; for upon this hint and another circumstance which fell in, both he and others took several occasions to declare that tho' they would serve the queen faithfully and exclusively of all other regards or engagements to her last breath, yet after her decease they would acknowledge the prince on whom the succession devolved by law, and to which they had sworn, and no other. This declaration would have been that of the far greatest number of the same party, and would have been stuck to by them, if the passions and private interests of *another party* had not prevailed over the true interest of a new family

I 6

mily that was going to mount the throne. You may ask me now, and the question will not be at all improper, how it came to pass, if the queen and her ministers had no design to defeat this succession, that so much suspicion of it prevailed, that so great an alarm was taken, and so great a clamour raised? I might answer you very shortly and very truly, by the strange conduct of a first minister, by the contests about the negotiations of the peace, and by the arts of a party.

The minds of some ministers are like the *sanctum sanctorum* of a temple I have read of somewhere: before it a great curtain was solemnly drawn; within it nothing was to be seen but a confused groupe of mis-shapen, and imperfect forms, heads without bodies, bodies without heads, and the like. To develop the most complicated cases, and to decide in the most doubtful, has been the talent of great ministers: it is that of others to perplex the most simple, and to be puzzled by the plainest. No man was more desirous of power than the minister here intended: and he had a competent share of cunning to wriggle himself into it; but then his part was over, and no man was more at a loss how to employ it. The ends he proposed to himself, he saw for the most part

part darkly and indistinctly : and if he saw them a little better, he still made use of means disproportionate to them. That private correspondence with the queen, which produced the change of the ministry in 1710, was begun with him whilst he was secretary of state, and was continued thro' him during the two years that intervened between his leaving the court, and his return to it. This gave him the sole confidence of the queen, put him more absolutely at the head of the party that came into power, and invested him with all the authority that a first minister could have in those days, and before any man could presume to rival in that rank, and in this kingdom, the rank of the ancient mayors of the palace in *France*. The tories, with whom and by whom he had risen, expected much from him. Their expectations were ill-answered : and I think that such management as he employed would not have hindered them long from breaking from him, if new things had not fallen in, to engage their whole attention, and to divert their passions.

The foolish prosecution of *SACHEVEREL* had carried party-rage to the height, and the late change of the ministry had confirmed

firmed it there. These circumstances, and many others relative to them, which I omit, would have made it impossible, if there had been honesty and wisdom enough to desire it, to bring about a coalition of the bulk of the tories and whigs at the latter end of this reign: as it had been brought about a few years before under the administration of my lord MARLBOROUGH and my lord GODOLPHIN, who broke it soon and before it had time to cement, by making such an use of it, as I am unable to account for even at this hour. The two parties were in truth become factions, in the strict sense of the word. I was of one, and I own the guilt; which no man of the other would have a good grace to deny. In this respect they were alike; but here was the difference: one was well united, well conducted, and determined to their future, as well as their present objects. Not one of these advantages attended the other. The minister had evidently no bottom to rest his administration upon, but that of the party, at the head of which he came into power: if he had rested it there, if he had gained their confidence, instead of creating even wantonly, if I may say so, a distrust of himself in them, it is certain he might have determined

determined them to every national interest during the queen's time, and after her death. But this was above his conception as well as his talents. He meant to keep power as long as he could, by the little arts by which he had got into it: he thought that he should be able to compound for himself in all events, and cared little what became of his party, his mistress, or the nation. That this was the whole of his scheme appeared sufficiently in the course of his administration; was then seen by some, and has been since acknowledged by all people. For this purpose he coaxed and persecuted whigs, he flattered and disappointed tories; and supported by a thousand little tricks his tottering administration. To the tory party he held out the peace, as an æra when all they expected should be done for them, and when they should be placed in such fulness of power and such strength of party, *that it would be more the interest of the successor to be well with them, than theirs to be well with him.* Such expressions were often used, and others of like import: and I believe these oracular speeches were interpreted, as oracles used to be, according as every man's inclinations led him.

The

The contests that soon followed, by the violent opposition to the negotiations of peace, did the good hinted at above to the minister, and enabled him to amuse and banter his party a little longer. But they did great, and in some respects irreparable, mischief to *Great Britain*, and to all *Europe*. One part of the mischief they did at home is proper to be mentioned here. They dipped the house of *Hanover* in our party-quarrels unseasonably, I presume to think, and impopularly; for tho' the contest was maintained by two parties that pretended equally to have the national interest at heart, yet the national interest was so plainly on one side of the question, and the other side was so plainly partial, at the expence of this interest, to the emperor, the princes of the empire, and the *Dutch* in particular; that a successor to the crown, who was himself a prince of *Germany*, should have preserved in good policy, for this very reason, the appearance at least of some neutrality. The means employed openly to break the queen's measures were indecent and unjustifiable: those employed secretly, and meditated to be employed, were worse. The ministers of *Hanover*, whose conduct I may censure the more freely because the late king did not approve

prove it all, took so remarkable a share in the first, that they might be, and they were, suspected of having some in the others. This had a very bad effect, which was improved by men in the two extremes. The whigs desired nothing more than to have it thought that the successor was theirs, if I may repeat an insolent expression which was used at that time: the notion did them honour, and tho' it could give no colour, it gave some strength to their opposition. The Jacobites insinuated industriously the same thing; and represented that the establishment of the house of *Hanover* would be the establishment of the whig party, and that the interests of *Great Britain* would be constantly sacrificed to foreign interests, and her wealth drained to support them under that family. I leave you to judge what ingression such exaggerations must find, on such occasion, and in such a ferment. I do not think they determined men to Jacobitism. I know they did not; but I know that they disinclined men from the succession, and made many who resolved to submit to it, submit to it rather as a necessary evil, than as an eligible good.

This was, to the best of my observation, and knowledge, the state of one party.

An.

An absurd one it was, and the consequences of it were foreseen, foretold, and pressed upon the minister at the time, but always without effect, and sometimes without any answers. He had some private intrigue for himself at *Hanover*: so he had at *Bar*. He was the bubble of one in the end: the pretender was so of the other. But his whole management in the mean time was contrived to keep up a kind of general indetermination in the party about the succession; which made a man of great temper once say to him with passion, that "he believed no other minister at the head of a powerful party would not be better at *Hanover*, if he did not mean to be worse there."

The state of the other party was this. The whigs had appeared zealous for the protestant succession from the time when king WILLIAM proposed it, after the death of the duke of GLOUCESTER. The Tories voted for it then, and the acts that were judged necessary to secure it, some of them at least, were promoted by them. Yet were they not thought, nor did they affect as the others did, to be thought extremely fond of it. King WILLIAM did not come into this measure, till he found, upon trial, that there was no other safe and practicable:

cable : and the tories had an air of coming into it for no other reason. Besides which, it is certain that there was at that time a much greater leaven of Jacobitism in the tory-lump, than at the time spoken of here.

Now thus far the whigs acted like a national party, who thought that their religion and liberty could be secured by no other expedient, and therefore adhered to this settlement of the crown with distinguished zeal. But this national party degenerated soon into faction ; that is, the national interest became soon a secondary and subservient motive, and the cause of the succession was supported more for the sake of the party or faction, than for the sake of the nation ; and with views that went more directly to the establishment of their own administration, than to a solid settlement of the present royal family. This appeared, evidently enough, to those whom noise and shew could not impose upon, in the latter end of the queen's reign, and plain beyond dispute to all mankind, after her decease. The art of the whigs was to blend, as undistinguishably as they could, all their party-interests with those of the succession : and they made just the same factious use of the supposed danger of it, as the tories had endeavoured to make some time before

fore of the supposed danger of the church. As no man is reputed a friend to christianity beyond the *Alpes* and the *Pyrenees*, who does not acknowledge the papal supremacy, so here no man was to be reputed a friend to the protestant succession who was not ready to acknowledge their supremacy. The interest of the present royal family was to succeed without opposition and risque, and to come to the throne in a calm. It was the interest of a faction that they should come to it in a storm. Accordingly the whigs were very near putting in execution some of the wildest projects of insurrections and rebellion, under pretence of securing what there was not sufficient disposition, nor any preparation at all made to obstruct. Happily for the public these designs proved abortive. They were too well known to have succeeded, but they might have had, they would have had, most fatal consequences. The storm, that was not raised to disturb and endanger the late king's accession, was only deferred. To a party, who meant nothing less than engrossing the whole power of the government and the whole wealth of the nation under the successor, a storm, in which every other man should be driven from

from him, was too necessary, not to be conjured up at any rate; and it was so immediately after the late king's accession. He came to the throne easily, and quietly, and took possession of the kingdom with as little trouble, as he could have expected if he had been not only the queen's successor, but her son. The whole nation submitted chearfully to his government, and the queen's servants discharged the duty of their offices, whilst he continued them in their offices, in such a manner as to merit his approbation. This was signified to some of them, to the secretaries in particular, in the strongest terms, and according to his majesty's express order, before the whole council of state. He might I think, I thought then that he ought, and every man except the earl of O——d, who believed or had a mind to make others believe that his influence would be great in the new reign, expected that he would have given his principal confidence and the principal power of the administration to the whigs: but it was scarce possible to expect, that he would immediately let loose the whole fury of party, suffer the queen's servants, who had surely been guilty of no crime against him nor the state, to be so bitterly persecuted;

214 *Of the STATE of PARTIES.*

cuted ; and proscribe in effect every man in the country who did not bear the name of whig. Princes have often forgot, on their accession to a throne, even personal injuries received in party quarrels: and the saying of LEWIS the twelfth of *France*, in answer to those who would have persuaded him to shew severity to LA TREMOUILLE, is very deservedly famous, “ God forbid, said he, that LEWIS the twelfth should revenge the quarrels of the duke of *Orleans*.” Other princes, who have fought their way to the throne, have not only exercised clemency, but shewn favour to those who had stood in arms against them : and here again I might quote the example of another king of *France*, that of HENRY the fourth. But to take an example in our own country, look back to the restoration, consider all that passed from the year 1641 to the year 1660, and then compare the measures that King CHARLES the second was advised to pursue for the establishment of his government in the circumstances of that time, with those which the late king was advised, and prevailed on, against his opinion, inclination, and first resolution, to pursue, in the circumstances I have just mentioned. I leave the conclusion to the candour and good sense of every impartial reader.

To

To these measures of unexpected violence alone it must be ascribed, that the pretender had any party for him of strength sufficient to appear and act. These measures alone produced the troubles that followed, and dyed the royal ermines of a prince, no way sanguinary, in blood. I am far from excusing one party, for suffering another to drive them into rebellion. I wish I could forget it myself. But there are two observations on that event, which I cannot refuse myself to make. One is, that the very manner in which this rebellion was begun shews abundantly that it was a start of passion, a sudden phrenzy of men transported by their resentment, and nothing less than the execution of a design long premeditated and prepared. The other is, that few examples are to be found in history, perhaps none, of what happened on this occasion, when the same men, in the same country, and in the compass of the same year, were ready to rise in arms against one prince without any national cause; and then provoked, by the violence of their councils, the opposite faction to rise in actual rebellion against the successor.

These

These are some of the effects of maintaining *divisions* in a nation, and of governing by *faction*. I might descend into a detail of many fatal consequences that have followed, from the first false step which was taken, when the present settlement was so avowedly made on the *narrow bottom* of *party*. But I consider that this discourse is growing into length; that I have had and shall have occasion to mention some of these consequences elsewhere; and that your own reflexions on what has been said, will more than supply what I omit to say in this place. Let me therefore conclude by repeating, That *division* has caused all the mischief we lament, that *union* can alone retrieve it, and that a great advance towards this union was the coalition of parties, so happily begun, so successfully carried on, and of late so unaccountably neglected, to say no worse. But let me add, that this union can never be compleat, till it become an union of the *head* with the *members*, as well as of the members with one another: and that such an union can never be expected till *patriotism* fills the *throne*, and *faction* be banished from the *administration*.



The E N D.

